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Towards a Theory and Method for Dispute Intervention:
A Cross-Cultural Perspective

by

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A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in
partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the
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Abstract

This peace studies thesis focuses on third-party cross-cultural dispute intervention. The research promotes the theory that each culture has unique peacemaking and peacebuilding strategies, an orientation which, until recently, differed from the ethnocentric "western" perspectives that dominated conflict theory and peace studies. This thesis proposes the need for a cultural awareness step in third-party intervention. A method, which involves analyzing certain "cultural conditions," is developed for gaining an emic perspective of a disputant's cultural perception of peace, conflict, dispute, and peacebuilding and peacemaking strategies. The method stems from the cross-cultural research of Augsburger (1992) and Ross (1993a, 1993b). The application of this method to the literature on the Azande and Awlad 'Ali cultures not only proves the method's ability to facilitate an emic perspective, but also demonstrates the importance of culture in cross-cultural disputes. The information gleaned from this method produces a peace methodological construct, a specific method for approaching a Zande or Awlad 'Ali disputant.

Acknowledgements

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Introduction

Conflict theory and peace studies have, until recently, been conceptualized and organized predominantly by Western cultural norms and practices. For example, Galtung (1981) suggests that, to date, the definition of peace has been too narrowly defined, as a result of humanity's tendency to perceive and globally apply their own cultural interpretations of such terms as peace ethnocentrically.[1] A richer understanding of the term will be achieved only through intercultural dialogue (Galtung 1981, 18(2):196). Sponsel (1994) suggests that this cross-cultural dialogue is occurring with ever-increasing contributions and applications of anthropological ethnographic and theoretical works to these fields. This application of anthropology is creating a greater cross-cultural perspective and appreciation for the divergent views and practices on peace, conflicts, and disputes forming new conceptual frameworks (Sponsel 1994, 7-12). This thesis promotes, on a more general level, the theory that each society--groups of people which possess a unique culture--have unique strategies for peacemaking and peacebuilding, strategies which are held in culture. This thesis promotes the specific theory that culture is a key component affecting the success or failure of third-party intervention in cross-cultural disputes.

Based on these theoretical premises, I propose that a third-party intervening in cross-cultural disputes must be aware of and familiarize him- or herself with the culture(s) of the disputants. Thus, I propose that a cultural awareness step must be included in the process of third-party intervention, a step not currently considered relevant by

all intervention theorists. For example, Burton, a well known theorist in this field and a staunch supporter of the Human Needs Theory, disregards culture as a key component to concluding disputes in his "problem-solving" intervention. The main cause of disputes is a desire to fulfill personal innate needs, and it is the fulfillment of these needs which must be the focus of third-party intervention (Roy 1990; Scimecca 1991). Within this cultural awareness step, a method for assessing the cultural peacemaking and peacebuilding strategies, and perspectives of peace, conflict, and dispute of the disputants must be employed. In this thesis, I outline a method for analyzing ethnographic and related literary works, a method formulated from the culturally sensitive cross-cultural research of several peace studies and conflict theorists.

The theories on which I base my work, as well as the method I outline, find their proof and applicability in my anthropological study of the traditional ways of the Azande of central Africa and the Awlad 'Ali of northeastern Africa. In this study, I gain some insight, or an "emic" perspective, into the ways in which each society perceives, understands, approaches, handles, and terminates disputes, and the ways they perceive, understand, and build peace. Since this thesis focuses on both peacebuilding and peacemaking, it falls within the perimeters of peace studies, a point which is discussed further later in this chapter.

A. TERMINOLOGY

From my research of the theoretical works of conflict theory and peace studies, it is apparent that these fields of study are wanting in the area of a canonized definition of terms; significant confusion

exists concerning the exact meaning and usage of terms.[2] Words such as conflict, dispute, settlement, negotiation, mediation, resolution, peace, and violence, are central terms. However, many theorists interchange terms such as conflict and dispute, or settlement, resolution, and negotiation, a practice recognized by Burton and Dukes (1990a, 1) and Ross (1993b, 17). This problem is confounded when authors do not define their use of terms in their own research, seemingly assuming that a common understanding exists, thus leaving it to the reader to ponder and decipher which definition is most likely being applied. It is precisely this state of affairs which compels me to define clearly the key terms I use in this thesis.

The most common use of the term conflict, according to the Second Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary, is a collision, clash, variance, or incompatibility of interests, opinions, statements, feelings, etc. ([1933] 1989, 3:713). Dispute, on the other hand, is defined as the act of debating, arguing often with altercation (Oxford English Dictionary 2nd ed. [1933] 1989, 4:827-828). Thus, conflict refers only to the point when two or more people become cognitively aware of the differences between them, and dispute refers to the action individuals or groups take to deal with their cognizance of the differences between them.

One way in which disputants can deal with their differences is by involving a biased third-party collaborator(s), and/or a neutral third-party intervener(s).[3] The biased collaborator supports and promotes the opinion of one of the disputants, thus, pitting himself or herself against the other disputant and becoming equally entangled in the dispute. The role of the neutral third-party person can go in several

directions; she or he can mediate, negotiate, arbitrate, or adjudicate. Mediation is a process in which a neutral third-party is invited to assist the disputants in reaching a conclusion on their own; the third-party has no power to enforce the conclusion made by the disputants ("Administrative Conference of the United States" cited in Scimecca 1991, 29). Negotiation is the act of holding "communication or conference (with another) for the purpose of arranging some matter by mutual agreement, to discuss a matter with a view to some settlement or compromise" (Oxford English Dictionary 2nd ed. [1933] 1989, 10:303). Settlement refers to an agreement or arrangement (Webster NewWorld Dictionary [1970] 1984, 1305). Arbitration involves a neutral third-party who renders his or her own conclusion based on the arguments given by the disputing sides ("Administrative Conference of the United States" cited in Scimecca 1991, 29). According to Keating and Shaw, adjudication also uses a third-party, but in this case, a standard of conduct, law, is applied to render a decision based on the arguments heard from both sides (1990, 6(3):217).

The action of those involved in a dispute, regardless of whether a third-party is present or not, can follow one of five different courses, according to Katz and Lawyer (1993, 13-17). A dispute can be collaborative or compromising. A collaborative strategy aims for a "win/win" outcome, with the disputants aiming to meet all the interests of both parties. Collaboration requires a cooperative spirit in which both parties work together towards a similar end and function to serve each other (Wright 1990, 19). Compromising actions are slightly different, creating a "mini-win/mini-lose" situation. Under a compromise, both parties partially satisfy their interests while

letting go of other interests. The course of a dispute can also be accommodating or controlling. Accommodation adheres to a "yield-lose/win" scenario, in which "one party yields to the other party (or parties)" (Katz and Lawyer 1993, 13). Controlling actions are clearly "win/lose" processes, in which one disputant's interests are imposed on the other party or parties (Katz and Lawyer 1993, 14). In this case, neither relationship nor the consequences to the losing party are relevant; the desired outcome of the winning party is what matters. The final possible course of a dispute is that of avoidance. Katz and Lawyer (1993) consider this a "lose/lose" outcome, because no solutions are reached or interests met.

Katz and Lawyer also suggest that these courses of dispute can lead to one of three outcomes (1993, 13). The dispute process can end in compromise/resolution, withdrawal/avoidance, or dominance/imposition. Resolution/compromise stem from a collaborative approach or compromising action, withdrawal/avoidance result from an avoidance process, and dominance/imposition emerge from an accommodating and controlling process. According to Katz and Lawyer (1993), dominance/imposition are the most likely to create, heighten, and/or perpetuate a volatile situation, with compromise/resolution promoting and/or continuing nonviolent interactions. Nonviolence resorts to means of persuasion other than physical or verbal abuse, means such as passive resistance or civil disobedience (Webster NewWorld Dictionary [1970] 1984, 969). Violence connotes verbal or physical action which results in injury to another person, whether psychological or physical.[4]

The final key term relevant to this thesis requiring an

explanation is that of culture. The term culture refers to the knowledge taught to members of a society through socialization; this knowledge is used by members of a society for productive and understandable interaction between members of that society and for personal adaptation to the immediate environment. Culture does not refer to behavior itself, "but [to] the knowledge used to construct and understand behavior" and the world in which a group of people live (Spradley and McCurdy 1990, 4-5). Or as Haviland puts it, culture is "a set of rules or standards shared by members of a society, which when acted upon by the members, produce behavior that falls within a range the members consider proper and acceptable" ([1975] 1987, 27). Thus, it is a

> set of shared ideals, values, and standards [for] behavior;
> it is the common denominator that makes the actions of
> individuals intelligible to the group. Because [people]
> share a common culture, [they] can predict how others
> are most likely to behave in a given circumstance and react
> accordingly (Haviland [1975] 1987, 27).

The term also encompasses the knowledge needed to construct and to use the materials employed by a society. Applying this definition of culture into a peace studies framework, we can say that culture--the constellation of norms, practices, and institutions--provides a basis for what groups and individuals fight over, the way they dispute to gain their goals, and the institutional resources which may help to shape the course and outcome of disputes (Ross 1993b, 2). However, culture not only refers to the norms, practices, and instigations for peacemaking, as just defined, but also to the norms, practices, and instigations for peacebuilding.

From this definition, one can see that I do not define culture to be a thing which has its own existence, separate from the humans who

use it. Neither is culture something which impresses itself upon the people who use it, forcing them to do its bidding. Both of these ideas are put forward by the prominent anthropologists Levi-Strauss (1969) and Radcliffe-Brown (1965). Culture results from the interactive and relational processes between people who have banded together for social purpose and survival reasons, and from the relational processes between a people and their environment.[5] Thus, culture is formed by and continually transformed through negotiation, violence, compromise, resolution, avoidance, dominance, and cooperative behaviors that occur within the relationships between a people and within their collective relationship to the environment.

Interestingly enough, the norms, beliefs, and other aspects of culture take part in informing the behaviors of the people, whether consciously or subconsciously, as they continue to define (change or maintain) their culture through successive generations. Intrinsically involved in the defining and redefining of culture is also the personality of each member of the society. As a result of personality--which is shaped by biology, personal experiences in life, socialization, and environment--each person in a society experiences, responds, and perceives his or her culture differently, bringing different ideas, behaviors, expectations, and demands to the defining process of culture.[6] Personality shapes culture by acting in situations in ways which are true to itself. For example, if a person chooses to act outside the acceptable cultural norms of his or her society, then a new pattern is introduced requiring the members of the society to respond to the new action. This is most evident in a situation where people of a culture deem a person's action to be

deviant. Deviance from accepted norms, such as conscientious objectors, can occur when the possible choices of behavior are incongruent with one's personality and convictions. Thus, when we talk about culture we are talking about average patterns of behavior, perceptions, and beliefs observed in most members of a social group.

B. HISTORY AND THEORETICAL TRENDS OF CONFLICT THEORY AND PEACE STUDIES, AND THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF ANTHROPOLOGY

The field of conflict theory has predominantly focused its energies on conflict and disputes, on the causes of conflict and disputes in society, and the ways they are managed. As Montagu so aptly points out, many theorists of this field have been fundamentally biased towards disputes in their perceptions and analyses of cultures (1994, ix). The result of this bias is a research that examines the structures of societies (and/or psychobiological makeup of humans) that manage or handle aggression to maintain the society. With those who study society with this bias,

> their working assumption is that a knowledge of the
> causes and function of war [and other disputes] will help
> to reduce the frequency and intensity of war [and disputes]
> and to find alternative ways of conflict resolution that will
> lead to a more peaceful world (Sponsel 1994, 6).

This bias has led to an interesting definition of peace: "the absence of war, violence, injustice, and oppression--public, or private in domestic life--and of hostility and damage to nature" (Barnaby 1988, 21). Even the Second Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary defines peace in this way, defining it as the freedom from or cessation of war, hostilities, and disorder ([1933] 1989, 11:383). This concept of peace, then, is termed a negative peace concept (Sponsel 1994, 6).[7]

In contrast, the emergence of peace studies has introduced a new

perspective on the areas of focus.[8] This school sees societies having structures (and/or psychobiological tendencies) which build peace and structures which manage or handle aggression, dependent upon the loci of peace and disputes. Peace is defined not only as the absence of war, but also as the "presence of freedom, equality, economic and social justice, cooperation, and harmony" (Sponsel 1994, 6). Peace studies, thus, has two components of inquiry: peacebuilding strategies and peacemaking strategies (Galtung 1985, 22(2):145). Galtung stresses that the two components, peacemaking and peacebuilding, complement each other, and both must be the center of attention in researching peace in cultures (1985, 22(2):145). The former focuses on how disputes occur in interactions and how disputes are managed--the focus of conflict theory--and the latter focuses on how societies promote peaceful cooperative interactions. This concept of peace held in peace studies is labeled a positive peace concept (Sponsel 1994, 6).

The field of Anthropology has tended to follow closely the same trends, moving from a research that functioned on a negative peace concept to one that included a positive peace concept.[9] Sponsel (1994) provides an excellent review of the trends that have occurred in anthropology. He suggests that although anthropologists have been creating ethnographies for over a century--ethnographies that depict both dispute- and peace-ridden societies--anthropologists have, to date, been predominantly biased towards a negative peace concept:

> The positive concept of peace can stimulate a broader and
> more balanced approach to research and teaching regarding
> violence/war and non-violence/peace as integral components
> of a dialectical process. This would help to counter the
> systemic bias within the discipline of anthropology: a
> tendency to focus on violence and war almost to the
> exclusion of nonviolence and peace, which can lead to a
> distorted view of human nature, ethnology, and ethnographic

cases (Sponsel 1994, 14).

Recently, several anthropologists have taken a perspective more common to peace studies, hopefully sparking a new trend in anthropology. For example, Montagu's works, according to Sponsel (1994), have a positive peace perspective. Also, Lizot (1994) in his chapter "Words in the Night: The Ceremonial Dialogue--One Expression of Peaceful Relationships Among the Yanomami" provides evidence of peacemaking and peacebuilding mechanisms in a society predominantly portrayed, by Chagnon ([1968] 1983), as a people who only know conflict and dispute.

The above historical review points towards two important factors which direct the type of research conducted. The first factor has to do with the researcher's orientation towards a negative or positive peace concept which determines the breadth of that study. The second factor has to do with the researcher's orientation towards the loci or causes (nature and/or nurture) of peace, conflict, and disputes, an orientation which determines where the researcher conducts his or her research. Having already discussed the first issue, I turn my attention to the second issue.

Anthropology predominantly concerns itself with analyzing and understanding culture, an orientation which clearly places anthropology within the nurture camp. However, an in depth analysis of the theoretical works of Durkheim and Bourdieu, two key theorists in anthropology, on the issue of culture present a picture in which nature and nurture both play parts in forming cooperative (peace) and aggressive (dispute) behaviors.

Durkheim is clearly a sociologist, but much of his theoretical work falls within and has contributed to the field of anthropology.

According to Durkheim's books <u>Rules of Sociological Method</u> (1950) and <u>Suicide: A Study in Sociology</u> (1951), society (Durkheim's word for culture) does not rise from the nature of individuals, but from the collective mind which forms when people interrelate and fuse into a group. Changes to society, the formation of a new "social fact", arise out of the conditions and impress their importance to continued collective living upon individuals. A social fact refers to the institutionalized forms of behavior which form a specific function in maintaining the collective mind. Human nature's propensity to accept the molding forces of society without resistance and human nature's natural tendency to group together are the only connection humans have with culture. The form of the collective mind, society, results from the conditions, not from conscious human intellect. The purpose of society is to meet the collective, rather than individual, needs. The collective needs are to organize, to meet the social needs, and to ensure community. Ensuring solidarity appears to be the general goal of these particular needs. Within highly specialized societies, organic solidarity is met by social facts ensuring continued cooperation between individuals. In less differentiated societies, mechanical solidarity occurs by maintaining a strong sense of commonality.

Humanity is clearly controlled by culture and has essentially no bearing in its own shape or form. But what of Durkheim's views on the nature and/or nurture debate? He inadvertently discusses the origin of both dispute and peace. His discussion of anomic suicide clearly expresses his views on the subject. According to Durkheim, humans have two types of needs. First, humans have the innate physical needs

(food, water, etc.) which are controlled by the autonomic nervous system. Secondly, humans have innate nonphysical needs of well-being, comfort, and luxury, needs which are controlled by the collective mind. He concludes that

> Nothing appears in man's organic nor in his psychological
> constitution which sets a limit to such tendencies. . . .
> They are thus unlimited so far as they depend on the
> individual alone (Durkheim 1951, 247).

In this scenario, humans have no conscious control over their needs; control is automatic and wielded by society; control, for Durkheim, refers to the act of determining the point at which each need is satisfied. The nonphysical needs (the needs of well-being, comfort, and luxury) are based on social factors such as occupation and class. These limits ensure that the goals of the people are attainable and in keeping with their means, thereby incurring a certain sense of satisfaction, solidarity, and the consequent survival of the collective mind. In times of crisis, society can lose control over limitations on the nonphysical needs and people automatically succumb to their passions and attempt to go beyond their means and seek to attain the goals of higher classes. This chaos nurtures jealousy, suicide, disputes between people of different classes, and inner tension at not being able to satiate the desires.

In conclusion, Durkheim's work suggests several points concerning disputes and peace. Fundamentally, Durkheim believes that conflicts and disputes are an innate part of humanity. Without the external controls of society, internal conflicts and external disputes automatically blossom. Even with the controls of society in place, the potential for such conflicts and disputes always lurks beneath the authority of society. Thus, society provides the peacemaking

mechanisms by impressing upon itself that solidarity is needed for the survival of the collective mind. Peace, for Durkheim, then, would most likely be a negative concept, being the absence of disputes.

By contrast, Bourdieu, a more contemporary Marxist theorist, views society as in an innate state of dispute, due to ongoing class struggle (Jenkins 1992, 129, 141). According to Jenkins's exegesis of Bourdieu, "people compete about culture and they compete with it" (1992, 128). Bourdieu suggests that cultural mechanisms, such as formal education, socialize each class to their particular *habitus*, the unconscious habitual script of rules and principles which dispose a person to a certain set of possible choices of action in a given situation. The specific reality or *habitus* to which the culture of a society adheres depends on who wins the battles over controlling the most economic, social, and other resources, battles fought between the social classes in social interactions. Thus, Bourdieu sees conflict and dispute as the prime movers and shapers of human life and culture. Peace across a whole society is impossible. It appears that the only cooperation occurs when the members of each class rally against other classes for the most resources and the chance to be on top (Jenkins 1992, 139). Bourdieu suggests that class struggle and subsequent cultural changes are always occurring, because as soon as one class becomes dominant, other classes immediately vie for the dominant position. Indeed, the class on top expects disputes with the lower classes as part of being on top (Jenkins 1992, 141). Thus, it is the perpetual dispute relationships between classes that shape culture.

Several conclusions can be made concerning Bourdieu's perspective on the origin of peace and disputes. Disputes, according to Bourdieu,

do not originate within individuals, but originate in the social interactions of people living together in an environment with limited resources. Nor does the origin of disputes appear to be learned; it is, instead, an inevitable result of interaction in a world of inevitable limited resources. There will be momentary external appearances of peace, after a class has gained dominance and before a new class vies for control, in which a forced stoppage of disputes between classes is made. However, under this momentary facade of peace, class conflicts still rage, waiting for the current culture to lose its hold in making peace. The external peace is attained through the use and presence of the institutions of culture. Thus, Bourdieu holds a negative concept of peace; peace is the absence of disputes.

Even in the works of these two theorists, disagreement exists as to the loci of conflict and dispute. For both Bourdieu and Durkheim, peace is only an external facade created and maintained by culture. For Durkheim, however, conflict and dispute are innate parts of humanity, whereas, for Bourdieu, conflict and dispute are not innate, but are caused by the external interaction between limited resources and the interaction of humans. This negative peace concept is changing as more anthropologists apply a positive peace perspective to their research. However, a concise conclusion within anthropology, stipulating the roles culture and nature play in the presence or absence of peace, conflicts, and disputes, is still not forthcoming.

The debate over the loci for cooperation (peace) and/or aggression (conflict and disputes) also rages between the schools of conflict theory and peace studies. Within the conflict theory school, the nature and/or nurture debate focuses primarily on the loci of

conflicts and disputes, giving some discussion to the antithesis of conflict and dispute, peace. Peace studies, however, pursues the loci of conflict, dispute, and peace directly and equally. To understand cooperative and aggressive human interactions, the peace studies school argues that one must study the possible loci of both. The following discussion will be a general presentation of some of the theoretical research pertaining to this area of contention.

Burton (1990) and his coauthorship with Dukes (1990a, 1990b) on Human Needs Theory, provides an interesting perspective on the loci of conflicts, disputes, and, their antithesis, peace.[10] In this theory, the basis of all human life is the drive to fulfill several basic human needs. Galtung (1985), who concurs with Burton's ideas, lists the basic needs as survival, welfare, freedom, and identity. These needs must be satisfactorily met for the personality of an individual to develop properly. The key to meeting these needs lies in culture's ability to ensure proper development: "the provision of institutional and structural conditions that made possible the full development of the person as an important means of avoiding and resolving conflict" (Burton 1990, 3).

If culture is unable to meet individual needs, "development is distorted and mutilated and the personality crippled. If this happens on a large scale, society becomes conflict [and dispute] ridden" (Roy 1990, 125). Society becomes dispute ridden because humans, according to Burton, will try to fulfill their needs by any means necessary not taking into account the needs of others. Society's role, then, is to find a mutually satisfactory way in coordinating the means of all its individuals so that all needs can be met satisfactorily. If society

fails in this task, chaos will ensue as each person myopically tries his/her own method to satisfy only his/her own needs.

Burton's understanding of conflict and disputes clearly places them within the biological make-up of all humans, a position he holds to strongly despite his more recent recognition of the minimal role of culture in conflict and dispute (Scimecca 1991; Boyd and Richardson 1986; Burton and Sandole 1987). Without culture, the loci for peacemaking, disputes would be a perpetual state of life. At this point, Burton's ideas correlate with Durkheim's theories on the origin of conflicts and disputes. Both theorists see the innate needs of humans--needs beyond the control of the conscious mind--as the inevitable cause of conflicts and disputes between persons. Further, like Durkheim and Bourdieu, Burton sees culture providing a tenuous, peaceful existence, but under this cultural surface, conflict perpetually rages, waiting to explode into dispute once culture becomes unstable. However, contrary to Durkheim, Burton makes no distinction between the needs; for Burton, the limits of all the needs appear to be set and monitored automatically by the organism. For Durkheim the limits are set by the organism or culture depending on the group of needs discussed.

So far in this discussion of the nature/nurture debate, I have looked at the theories that argue that human aggression and conflict are biologically innate, a point reiterated by Durkheim. Indeed, for Burton, as for Durkheim and Bourdieu, any notion of peace results from culture. Other peace and conflict research, however, provides alternate perspectives on the origins of peace, conflict, and disputes.

Sipes (1973), in his article "War, Sports and Aggression: An

Empirical Test of Two Rival Theories," tests the drive discharge model, testing the nature model and the culture pattern model. Using animal research, Sipes determined that because animals have no innate propensity to war, neither do humans (1973, 75:80). He focuses on animal studies because of the tremendous difficulties theorists have in separating nature and nurture in human activity. Animals are said to be without culture, and, thus, may show what the instincts of humans would be without culture.[11] He concludes that the tendency for humans to engage in disputes is carried in human culture (1973, 75:80). Aggression is the product of culture. Taking his work a step further, then, peace appears to be a product of nature.

Goldschmidt (1994) provides another angle to this nature/nurture debate. He researches ethnographic literature of cultures that are considered to be in a state of chronic warfare. He looked at cultures from the North American Plains, the lowlands of South America, and the island of New Guinea to research how such cultures manage to formulate peaceful relations between tribes and how these peaceful relationships are maintained (1994, 109-110). From this in depth analysis, he concludes that humans are both innately aggressive and cooperative. For example, the innate desire for ego-gratification requires both the antisocial side of competition with others and the social side of needing accolades from others (Goldschmidt 1994, 127). Culture, then, highlights either one or both: "All that needs to be added to this scenario to render it a veritable formula for war is for the society to place a high value on aggressiveness and ferocity" (Goldschmidt 1994, 127). The opposite would occur if accolades and cooperation were deemed desirable by society. In the case of these warring societies,

culture has emphasized the aggressive part of this desire.

Lastly, Barnaby (1988) provides a similar view to Goldschmidt (1994). In this work, aggression and cooperation are seen as dual aspects of human nature: "It was the instinct to co-operate, to share the burdens and the fruits of existence, which originally brought people together in large social groups" (Barnaby 1988, 24). The innate human drives for cooperation, and a shared morality and spirituality make possible a legal and religious code, a code which governs behavior, allowing large groups to live in peaceful existence and with a common purpose (Barnaby 1988, 24). Aggression is also instinctive. However, unlike the theories discussed so far, the aggressive instinct in Barnaby's theory has a function in assuring a peace in society: "Even our aggressive instincts have a social function in regulating behaviour . . ." and ensuring coexistence. (Barnaby 1988, 25). Cooperation, then, is the essential instinct which has allowed human groups to live together for centuries and in very large groups.

C. OVERVIEW

This historical look at the theoretical trends of peace studies provides an excellent departure point for my research. From this history, it should be clear that the combination of peace studies and anthropology in researching conflict, dispute, and peace (which I propose to do) is a natural one with an established precedent. Peace studies take interest not only in peacemaking and peacebuilding strategies, but, recently, in moving towards a multicultural perspective on the issues in order to evolve beyond the predominantly western concepts and theory that have dominated the field to date. It is believed, and correctly so, that cross-cultural research will bring

to the field new ideas and concepts about what peace, conflict, disputes are and how to build and manage them differently.[12] Through my method I hope to encourage this cross-cultural research and bring this "emic" perspective into the meeting rooms of third-party interveners. I encourage this type of research through proving that different perspectives exist between the Azande and the Awlad 'Ali, two cultures which fit Augsburger's (1992) classification of a "traditional" culture. I bring this type of research into the meeting rooms by providing a straight-forward method which, when applied to the available literature on the cultures of the disputants involved, promotes understanding of the different perspectives each disputant has concerning peace, conflict, and disputes.

In the opening comments to this chapter and this thesis, I stressed strongly the importance of a third-party intervener understanding the cultural perspective of the disputants involved if he or she wishes to resolve the situation. Thus, this thesis focuses on culture, however, that does not mean that I discount the importance of biology or other unknown factors. On the contrary, this thesis does not attempt to synthesize all known causes into a perfect cohesive theory and practice. I consider culture to be one key component to concluding cross-cultural disputes amicably

In closing, I chose the peace study research model because its scope of research is much broader than the conflict theory approach. It is a serious error or oversight on the part of conflict theorists to miss the area of peacebuilding. In addition, my understanding of peace, conflict, and disputes is more in keeping with the positive peace perspective promoted by peace studies. I think all three states

of relationships (peace, conflict, and dispute) hold their own

strategies in cultures, and do not think peace results from the absence

of conflict and dispute. Humans are social animals, requiring the

continued presence of others for survival, nurture, comraderie, and

much more. If cooperation was not possible and conflict and dispute

inevitable behaviors, the meeting of these social needs would not be

possible.

Notes

[1]   In his article, Galtung (1981) looks specifically at the concept of peace. Galtung (1981) provides strong evidence for a different perceptual understanding of the term peace, between the Western and Eastern regions of the globe.

[2]   I suggest reading and comparing the works of Burton and Dukes (1990a)and Ross (1993b) in their use of the terms conflict and dispute.

[3]   David Augsburger (1992) discusses in detail the various types of third-party relationships. He refers to these three-way relationships as triangulations or triads. His discussion includes a multicultural perspective, drawing examples from many different cultural triangulations.

[4]   Two levels have been noted in the concept of violence, according to Galtung (1985). One is overt or direct, while the other is more covert or unintentional. The direct violence is a premeditated intent on the part of the aggressor to hurt physically or verbally a person. Covert violence has been termed structural violence by Galtung and refers to a situation where the relations are peaceful, but institutional structures of the society exploit a people (1985, 22(2):145). Thus, "individuals may do enormous amounts of harm to other human beings without ever intending to do so, just performing their regular duties as a job defined in the structure" (1985, 22(2):145). For more information on structural violence, see his original article (Galtung 1969).

[5]   Ecological anthropologists specifically study the relationship between humans and their environment. Their aim is to understand how humans and environment shape each other, by studying both components.

[6]   The importance of personality in the formation and transformation of culture is demonstrated in the research of Houston and Snyder (1988). Houston and Snyder, in their psychological research of western people, found two general personality types, in which each tended to respond and perceive external stimuli in different ways. The Type A person is often time conscious, restless and impatient, competitive, angry, irritable, and hostile. However, "the Type A behavioral personality is not a fixed personality type, and, thus, will often be elicited only by appropriate stimuli" (Houston and Snyder 1988, 19). Type B behavior, on the other hand, is "considered to be more relaxed, easygoing, and readily satisfied, and less concerned with achievement" (Houston and Snyder 1988, 10). Ward et al. (1986), Glass et al. (1980), and Houston and Snyder (1988) are just a few of the many studies on how these two personality types seem to respond differently to the same stimuli in the environment.
        Also, Watson and Watson-Franke (1985) discuss at length the importance of life history in understanding a culture. In general, they suggest that the gathering of many life histories is important to understanding a culture, because each person has his or her own unique subjective culturally defined world (Watson and Watson-Franke 1985, 2).

[7]   For an excellent example of how the western culture is biased towards this negative peace concept, I suggest reading Lakoff and Johnson (1980), in their book Metaphors We Live By. Their work focuses on metaphors and, as one of many examples, they present the western metaphor "argument is war". Their theory is that "the concepts that govern our thought are not just matters of the intellect. They also govern our everyday functioning, down to the most mundane details" (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 3).

[8]   Peace studies, in North America, began in the 1940s, after World War II, and took hold in the 1960s, during the civil rights movement and anti-war demonstrations (Sponsel 1994, 5). As Spousel suggests, for the roots of peace studies, one could go as far back to the "ancient Greek philosophers such as Plato," but it was Quincy Wright who inaugurated the present day peace studies movement (Sponsel 1994, 5).

[9]   Peace and conflict theorists recognize similar debates occurring in the field of philosophy and psychology. Sandole (1993) provides an excellent review of various thinkers, such as Lorenz, Spinoza, Freud, and Niebuhr. Montagu (1994) provides examples of letters written by Freud supporting Sandole's (1993) interpretation of Freud. The Anthropology of Peace and Nonviolence also provides a review of the philosophical and theoretical thoughts of people from outside the peace and conflict schools. There are other thinkers, not discussed in these books, whose conclusions of the nature and/or nurture debate support dispute or peace as being natural or learned. For example, John Locke, a seventeenth-century British philosopher and one of the forbears of psychology, suggested that humans are born as blank slates. The expansion of thoughts and ideas result from a persons sensory encounter with the physical world (Rubin and McNeil 1985, 6). This implies that dispute is not innate, but learned. Whereas, other psychologists of his day concluded that we are born with all knowledge; it is just a matter of the mind unfolding its hidden knowledge. In this case, dispute is implicitly innate.

[10]   This theory existed for some time before Burton, according to Scimmeca (1991). However, Scimmeca (1991) points out that Burton is the key theorist associated with this theory to date, a fact supported by my own literary research.

[11]   The belief that culture is a uniquely human phenomenon is being seriously and, in my estimation, successfully challenged, through the exhaustive work of primatologists such as Jane Goodall and the late Dian Fossey. Primates are considered to be without culture, and because of their very close genetic similarities to humans--"more than ninety-eight percent of [chimp] genetic material is identical to [humans]"--it is believed that extrapolations can be made about what is innate to humans (Miller 1995, 188(6):110).

[12]   Sponsel (1994) makes a strong argument for the relevance of combining the two fields in the research of peace, conflict, and dispute.

Chapter One

A Means for Building Peace Methodological Constructs

Anthropology, in its most general definition, is the study of humanity: what is universal to humans that is distinct from other animals? More specifically, anthropology focuses on that unique aspect of humanity called culture.[1] Within this field, research is directed towards understanding what is universally similar in all cultures, what is distinct between cultures, and the relationships between forces that shape cultures, which cultures in turn shape. In the Introduction, I point out one of these forces, biology, focusing on the various theories concerning the relationship of biology and culture and the role each plays in the manifestation of cooperation and/or aggression in societies.

Recognizing the complexity of the reciprocal relationship between culture and the many forces interacting with it, I take a unidirectional approach. I focus specifically on culture, the adaptive behaviors to which most members of a society adhere and adjust, and which they pass on to their children through socialization. Adding a peace studies perspective to this interest, it is my goal to analyze and to understand the different cultural perceptions towards and behaviors involving peace, conflict, dispute, peacemaking, and peacebuilding of the Azande and Awlad 'Ali. I recognize that due to personality and a person's ability to think individually, one can find, in cultures, multiple variations in behavior patterns and orientations. However, a researcher will also observe generally agreed-upon trends of acceptable behaviors and orientations, trends which are sanctioned and reinforced by fellow

community members who adhere to, validate, and alter their culture. It is these general trends that I will analyze and highlight in the cultures I research and compare. This analysis and understanding is limited specifically to the method I propose below.

The method that I propose grows out of the cross-cultural work of two researchers, Augsburger (1992) and Ross (1993b). Their research is particularly pertinent because the very nature of their work assumes that cultural groups relate to peace, conflict, and dispute differently. Their research aims to elucidate those differences. Augsburger (1992) consolidates a vast amount of cross-cultural peace studies research and ethnographic work into a list of interrelated characteristics common to cultures. Ross (1993b) provides a different set of important characteristics common to all cultures, characteristics which interact to predict the level and direction of aggression and cooperation in any society. Also, these researchers clearly organize and focus on several key areas of culture that have a direct correlation to peacebuilding and peacemaking.

In this chapter, then, I outline a method whose purpose is to provide a third-party intervener with an "emic" perspective on a culture's approach to peace, conflict, and dispute. An emic perspective is one in which the perspective of others is taken into account and in which the understanding of the "other" is important. Because the data for this thesis is based on literature available, it is to be expected that my cultural analysis is limited by that literature; neither analysis comprehensively discusses all aspects of my method. In some instances, the information was insufficient to render a clear decision, and, in other cases, the information simply was not available.

A. **PEACE STUDIES AND CONFLICT THEORY RESEARCH: CULTURAL CONDITIONS FOR UNDERSTANDING PEACE, CONFLICT, AND DISPUTE**

The cross-cultural research conducted by Augsburger (1992) is a compilation of his own experiences and research and the work of many other researchers. In summary, his book provides a consolidative list--complete with cultural examples--of general, interrelated cultural characteristics which he then uses to propose and to prove the presence of two basic categories of cultures: "traditional" and "modern". These categories define orientational attributes of cultures. The mechanisms a society uses to achieve these orientations are unique to the society.

The key differences between "modern" and "traditional" cultures, as illuminated by Augsburger (1992), lie in their distinctive orientation toward context, interaction, and loci of dispute. "Modern" cultures are oriented towards being low-context, individualistic in disputes, direct in interactions, and instrumental in reasons for disputes. In "modern" cultures, context (the situational factors and group expectations of and norms for behavior) has little to do with determining or influencing the development of a dispute, its legitimacy, and the direction it takes (Augsburger 1992, 28). Instead, the individuals involved in the dispute give direction and form to the situation. Citing Ting-Toomey (1982), Augsburger argues that personal perception that another has done something wrong determines a need for a response which, in turn, provokes a dispute (1992, 29). Also, disputes, in a "modern" culture, do not arise from a person's inability to read indirect verbal and behavioral cues; if a person wants something, he or she must communicate the message directly (Augsburger 1992, 30). Each person is expected to address the situation using unambiguous terms, speaking frankly and specifically, confronting each other directly

(Augsburger 1992, 28). Finally, the reason for pursuing a conflict in a "modern" culture is usually instrumental (Augsburger 1992, 29); that is, a dispute results from a clash in goals and from each disputant trying to press for a change in circumstances to his or her favor (Augsburger 1992, 29).

Conversely, "traditional" cultures, according to Augsburger, are high-context, collectivistic in disputes, indirect in interactions, and expressive in purpose for pursuing a conflict (1992, 28-29). Disputes in high-context and collectivistic cultures proceed "according to cultural and social controls," and rely on several factors in determining the legitimacy of a dispute (Augsburger 1992, 28). Here, the violation of group norms, rather than individually determined norms, determines the legitimacy of a dispute (Augsburger 1992, 30). Further, in "traditional" cultures the messages sent are both stated by the sender and implied from the situation: "One knows from the context what is appropriate and offers it without question" (Augsburger 1992, 30). Hall makes a similar point when he observes that in a dispute situation the offended person speaks indirectly by talking "around and around the point, in effect putting all the pieces in place except the crucial one" (1976, 98). The context of the situation should explain the rest. Thus, "when conflict occurs, the contextual data are assimilated with the content of communication, so the triggering event will be less a particular offense, more a sequence of situational, relational, and communal circumstances" (Augsburger 1992, 30-31). Clearly, such cultures are not individualistic but are collectivistic: a dispute usually occurs only with group approval and because the dispute is a group offense, and usually the behavior of the parties in dispute are

continually monitored by the community. In keeping with this collectivist mindset, a "traditional" culture employs indirect and ambiguous speech, indirect action, and other subtle approaches in dealing with disputes (Augsburger 1992, 28): "one expects the necessary information to be supplied in any message" (Augsburger 1992, 30). Finally, "traditional" cultures employ an expressive purpose of disputes: "Expressive conflicts arise from a desire to release tension, to express frustration, and to discharge emotion and are usually generated from hostile or negative feelings" (Augsburger 1992, 29). The goal, then, is not to change or to adjust things in society, but to discharge tension and bring society back to normal, preconflict functioning.

The differences between the "traditional" and "modern" cultures reveal themselves at my workplace where I work with a Canadian aboriginal man; most other staff are from a "western" culture. The aboriginal has muscular dystrophy and is wheelchair bound. One of his duties is to bring food and drink to the room where we work, and the rest of the staff distribute it to the residents. When this man brings the tray of edibles into the room, he says nothing. Instead, he sits quietly until we either take the tray from him or ask if he would like the tray placed in the refrigerator. He assumes that the context explains itself: he cannot lift the tray, and he always delivers the food and drink; implicitly everyone should notice and know his needs without verbal cues from him. This has, on occasion, created some conflict with those staff with "western" cultural upbringing. They expect him to ask for assistance directly and assume that, by remaining silent, this man is being manipulative and weak. Both parties behave

and think as their culture expects them to behave and think.

A further difference between the two types of cultural orientations is in dispute intervention practices. Augsburger observes that people from "modern" cultures do not immediately seek the intervention of a third-party (1994, 32, 191). Third-party intervention in a dispute is considered an attack on the autonomy, maturity, and independence of the parties involved (Augsburger 1992, 32-33). A competent mature person should be able to deal with the situation independently, and the way to deal with the situation is to be direct (Augsburger 1992, 28, 88-91). Intervention is a last resort, used only when the disputants meet an impasse. The option to disputants in "modern" cultures is the institutional law, through the intervention of the police and courts (Augsburger 1992, 32-33, 192). "Traditional" cultures, on the other hand, welcome third-party intervention and view it as a highly developed art (Augsburger 1992, 33, 191-192). Depending on the culture, a community might use family mediation, clan resolution, caste adjudication, community mediation, tribal or village palavers, political brokers, local or regional headmen, religious leaders, or other third-party interventions (Augsburger 1992, 192). Augsburger notes that "where familial, tribal, and communal controls are strong, law [police and courts,] is weak," thus, police and formal courts are likely to be the absolute last resort if they exists at all (1992, 192). The use of a third party is in keeping with other important practices and attitudes common to "traditional" cultures, such as indirectness, interdependence, solidarity, "face-saving", and hierarchy.

The notion of "facework" is also highlighted by Augsburger (1992) as another area of contrast between "traditional" and "modern" cultures.

"Facework" is

> a psychological image that can be granted and lost and fought
> for and presented as a gift; it is the public self-image that
> every member of a society wants to claim for himself or
> herself; it is a projected image of one's self in a relational
> context (Augsburger 1992, 85).

Drawing from the works of Gudykunst and Ting-Toomey (1988), Brown and
Levinson (1978), and his own work, Augsburger (1992) makes the following
conclusions concerning the differences between these two types of
cultures. For the "traditional", predominantly Eastern and Southern
Hemisphere cultures, "facework" strategies involve "other-positive" and
"other-negative" behaviors (Augsburger 1992, 89). The term "other" is
important because it signifies the culture's collective mindset and the
importance of others in the community and in relationships. In this
case, "the concept of face covers both self-esteem and the esteem of the
other" because "the self is a situationally and relationally based
concept that is centered at the meeting point of self and other"
(Augsburger 1992, 84, 87). Other-positive strategies "use certain
communication strategies to defend and support the other person's need
for inclusion and association", thereby gaining the approval of the
community and preserving personal "face" needs (Ting-Toomey cited in
Augsburger 1992, 89). Other-negative strategies use "certain
interaction strategies to signal respect for the other person's need for
freedom, space, and dissociation" (Ting-Toomey cited in Augsburger 1992,
89). My mother-in-law provides a good example of an other-negative
strategy. When she wanted me to mow her lawn, she would never ask
directly "Will you cut the grass?" Rather, she would talk about the
length of the grass, how she could not mow the lawn herself, and would
even repeatedly mention that the lawn mower was in the garage, filled

with gasoline and ready to go. This form of questioning left an out for me: I could choose to ignore the subtle request and not be inconvenienced. Further, her own "face" would be saved; she would avoid rejection if I did not respond.

Conversely, modern cultures are preoccupied with their own "face" needs; as can be expected in an individualistic culture, each individual protects and enhances his or her own "face", using either "self-positive" and "self-negative" "face" strategies. Self-positive refers to the "use of certain communication strategies to defend and protect one's need for inclusion and association" (Ting-Toomey cited in Augsburger 1992, 89). Self-negative "means the use of certain interaction strategies to give oneself freedom and space, to protect self from the other's infringement on one's autonomy" (Ting-Toomey cited in Augsburger 1992, 89).

To conclude his section on "facework", Augsburger notes that "negative" and "positive" "facework" strategies can be found simultaneously in cultures, but when it comes to disputes one will prevail (1994, 88). Augsburger writes that in "traditional" cultures either other-positive or other-negative will dominate actions in disputes, and in "modern" cultures self-positive or self-negative will prevail in disputes (Ting-Toomey cited in Augsburger 1992, 89).

In his discussion on the points above, Augsburger (1992) talks in generalities, showing the general orientational tendencies of each type of culture. It will remain to be seen if the Azande and Awlad 'Ali fit these assertions, and what type of strategies or mechanisms they employ to achieve these orientations. In his discussion of gender in culture, however, Augsburger (1992) cannot delineate specific differences between

"traditional" and "modern": "Throughout history and across cultures, human beings have dealt with the relationship between the two sexes in an almost infinite variety of ways" (Augsburger 1992, 171). He, therefore, highlights gender roles as an area of cultural orientation to investigate. Augsburger does mention, using the work of Ridd and Callaway (1986), that across most cultures, both "traditional" and "modern", similar roles are established for each sex: institutional power is controlled by men whereas women's power is usually diffused, individualized, and outside male public institutions; women acting in public usually resort to the male framework (Augsburger 1992, 170). Within the focus of this thesis, I am particularly interested in the roles each gender plays in matters of peacemaking and peacebuilding.

Unfortunately, Augsburger (1992) does not appear to view these two types of cultures and the orientations they represent as a continuum of possibilities in which a culture may fit. From lack of a clear discussion on his part, I conclude that a culture is either "modern" or "traditional". I hesitate to use his work in such a rigid fashion, the mere presence and action of enculturation, cultural diffusion, and cultural diversity supports the fact that there is a continuum along which all cultures can be plotted, and that cultures cannot be grouped into such rigid categories. I view these two categories as two extremes along a continuum. A culture may tend towards one type or another; however, it is unrealistic to expect a culture to characterize completely one of Augsburger's (1992) categories.

On the whole, Augsburger's (1992) research suggests that cultures can be categorized as "modern" or "traditional". Augsburger's (1992) research, however, is particularly applicable to this thesis because it

provides the apparatus by which one can determine the conditions of disputes and peace--that is the conditions under which disputes and peace occur--in any given culture and thereby determine the culture's orientation towards peacemaking and peacebuilding. Augsburger argues that by determining when disputes are acceptable in a culture, how disputes are suitably expressed, and with whom it is acceptably pursued, one can reach a fundamental understanding of a culture's peace orientation (1994, 28-35).

Ross (1993a, 1993b) also presents a cross-cultural comparative study. He theorizes and verifies the importance of socialization practices and organization practices in social disputes. Ross's (1993b) cultural sample group is drawn from the work of Murdock and White's (1969) Standard Cross-Cultural Sample. He uses ninety-nine of the cultures covered in this sample, all of which are pre-industrial societies from around the world. These ninety-nine are further researched using ethnographic data to provide a more complete picture of the culture. Ross's study "is designed to produce generalizations about conflict behavior in pre-industrial societies" (1993b, 71). For the purpose of this thesis, I focus almost entirely on organizational practices, since the psychological portion of his work mostly lies beyond the bounds of this thesis. Before going further, I should mention that Ross (1993a, 1993b) uses the word "conflict", in many cases, to refer to "disputes", according to the way I have chosen to define these terms. For the sake of consistency, I use the term "dispute" where appropriate when Ross (1993a, 1993b) uses the term "conflict".

Ross's (1993b) application of Structural Theory looks at the

effects of organizational patterns that affect certain overall behavioral responses within a culture, and which can be linked to the targets of disputes and cooperation in a cultural group. The premise of this theory is that societies advance and protect interests in different ways, and through studying the way they organize themselves one can determine the way in which the society disputes (Ross 1993b, 11). According to Ross (1993b), each structure promotes specific dispute patterns, or, from a peace perspective, each structure promotes both specific dispute patterns and peace patterns. This theory explains with whom a dispute will be low and cooperation high in emotional and ambiguous situations, and with whom the opposite would occur in similar situations.

Under Ross's (1993b) umbrella of structural theory is the theory of Cross-Cutting Ties. This theory looks at the complexity of interconnecting links between members of a society based on shared interests, and studies how those links affect peacemaking and peacebuilding behaviors (Ross 1993b, 36). These interests can be rooted in economy, social life, politics, kinship, age, ritual ties, local power groups, and effective bonds (Ross 1993b, 38-39). The strength and configuration of these interests in a society have a direct bearing on "the origin and expansion of [disputes] and make their peaceful resolution more or less likely" (Ross 1993b, 39). The theory recognizes that organizational patterns can go in two directions based upon the structure of interests. Shared interests can be structured either through "cross-cutting ties" or "reinforcing ties".

When a society has mechanisms that promote a cross-cutting ties organization, no specific independent core groups are formed based on

shared interests (Ross 1993b, 39). Instead, shared interests are

expansive, reaching out across many diverse people within the society,

and are not limited to a small number of people. In societies with a

greater proportion of cross-cutting ties, both the occurrence and the

escalation of disputes into harsh and drawn-out disputes are usually

less likely (Ross 1993b, 39). Ross points out that sharing interests

with many members encourages trust, reduces suspicion, and encourages

cooperation, because it reduces the fear of interacting with strange

people, a fear which creates ambiguous behavioral situations (1993b,

39). The disputes that do occur are usually minor and quickly resolved

in such societies: when most members of the society hold interests with

both disputants, gathering a large support group for one side of a

dispute is particularly difficult (Ross 1993b, 39). Indeed, because of

the interests that most members of the society are likely to share with

both disputants, other members will usually encourage quick closure to

the dispute, and, thus, prevent continued festering. For example, Ross

points out that among the Lepcha of Nepal, "Quarreling is so strongly

disapproved that it is the responsibility of all to make every effort to

prevent disputes or to stop them once they have broken out" (1993b, 91).

Even though their culture is split up into distant villages, "there is

extensive cooperation" between villages on certain occasions (Ross

1993b, 90).

     Unlike cross-cutting ties, which promote sharing many different

interests across a diverse number of members in a society, reinforcing

ties promote the formation of many small groups of people within a

society. Such core groups are, again, structured by common interest(s)

held by all members of the core group, but other members of the larger

society do not share those interests (Ross 1993b, 39). For instance,
membership of street gang is based on one or more common interests (skin
color, turf, language, culture, shared experiences, etc.) that members
of a larger society or another street gang do not share. Again, the
shared interests, through reinforcing ties, encourage trust, reduce
suspicion, and encourage cooperation, because they reduces the fear of
interacting with strange people and the subsequent creation of ambiguous
situations. This bonding, however, occurs only among those who are part
of a particular core group (Ross 1993b, 39). Ross states that in such
societies, disputes usually escalate, are expansive in their inclusion
of others, and are, as a result, hard to resolve (1993b, 39). Because
commonalities are shared only within a core group--one of many core
groups within one society--a person belonging to the society has a
greater chance of coming into contact with a stranger having no shared
interests. The lack of shared interests also means there is no
predetermined behavioral structure for cooperation if the contact also
involves a dispute. This, coupled with the fact that the members of
each disputant's core group are also unfamiliar with each other, rules
out the possibility of fellow members encouraging a quick resolution.
Reinforcing ties encourage cooperation, trust, friendship, etc. only
within the group. Further, when a member of a core group falls into a
dispute with a member of another core group of the same society, both
disputants automatically receive strong support for their plight in the
dispute, a factor which quickly heightens and prolongs disputes (Ross
1993b, 39).

Ross's (1993b) use of the Cross-Cutting Ties Theory suggests
several important aspects of social organization. My work focuses on

the ways in which each culture configures its own interests. I use the four areas of culture Ross studied (interconnectedness, marriage and residency, local power groups, economic exchange) to grasp the configuration of the Azande and Awlad 'Ali (1993b, 40-43). The scale of interconnectedness or presence of multiple reference groups in a culture is one factor Ross (1993b) uses to assess the interest ties between members of a culture. He suggests, that at a basic level, all members of a society hold more than one social identity (1993b, 40). Considered to be universal identities of all members of any culture are age and gender (Ross 1993b, 40). Ross (1993b) argues that the number of social identities a society promotes in its members--identities which occur when members hold common interests with many other members through social organizations such as kinship and age-grades--is a significant indicator for understanding the cross-cutting ties of a culture. Thus, to understand the nature of relational ties in a culture, one must look for the existence of smaller groups in that culture, groups which are each based on their own interests. Related to this, one must also study the culture's mechanisms for forming alliances and their usages, as this also elucidates the level of cross-cutting or reinforcing interests in the culture.

Marriage and residency are also important areas to research when evaluating interests and relational ties. For example, marriages that occur outside kin groups and community (exogamy) promote interest ties with other groups of people who might otherwise be strangers, whereas, endogamous practices only enhance relationships within a group, avoiding contact with or creating relationships with other groups (Ross 1993b, 42). Practising polygyny (or polyandry) also affects dispute patterns,

because "it creates local male groups with common, but narrow, interests in obtaining women from other neighboring communities," thus contributing to a reinforcing ties pattern (Ross 1993b, 42). Marriage residency patterns are also important. Studies have determined that matrilocality promotes a trend towards more external than internal disputes, with patrilocality producing the opposite affect. This is the case because

> matrilocal residence disperses related men and inhibits
> internal conflict which would pit related males against each
> other but increases the likelihood of external [disputes],
> as alliances among local communities in a society are
> relatively easy to build (Ross 1993b, 42).[2]

Ross (1993b) also studies local power groups in an effort to understand the structure of interests in a society. Previous studies of power groups have given considerable attention to the presence and actions of fraternal interest groups, a practice Ross (1993b) continues. These studies suggest that the existence of such groups usually corresponds with internal conflict in politically uncentralized societies (Ross 1993b, 42-43).

Lastly, Ross (1993b) looks at the type of economic exchanges occurring within a society and between societies. This particular aspect reflects the work of Mauss (1967) in his study of gift exchanges. The effects of such exchanges within a society create interdependency, and "inhibit overt fighting and encourage the development of peaceful mechanisms for managing disputes when they arise" (Ross 1993b, 43). I pursue this point under the section of alliances as well, because the product of such exchanges is usually an alliance.

The points raised by Ross (1993b) and the results of his research suggest that the cultural characteristics he measured hold a significant

value in understanding peacebuilding and peacemaking strategies in societies. Like Augsburger (1992), these cultural characteristics are apparatuses for determining the conditions of disputes and peace of a given culture. Combining Ross's (1993b) work with Augsburger's (1992) expands one's ability to determine a culture's orientation towards peacemaking and peacebuilding. In the two case studies that follow, I first will check the general orientation of the Azande and Awlad 'Ali according to Ross's (1993b) main characteristics, and then will determine the mechanisms which create that orientation.

B. CONCLUSION

Combining the research results of Augsburger (1992) and Ross (1993b) presents an excellent foundational list of conditions of disputes and peace found in most, if not all, cultures. These conditions correlate with the direction of peacemaking and peacebuilding strategies found in a society, and will form the basis for my method for analyzing a culture's peace strategies. This method of cultural analysis is a key part of third-party intervention methodology, if a permanent and amicable conclusion to a dispute is desired.

To gain an emic perspective, then, a third-party intervener, drawing on Augsburger's (1992) work, can determine whether a culture places a priority on collectivism, context, indirectness, third-party intervention, expressiveness, and other-positive and other-negative facework, or a priority on individualism, low context and collectivism, no mediation, instrumentalism, directness, and self-positive and self-negative facework. Drawing on Ross's (1993b) work, the intervener can determine what structural patterns a culture uses--what marriage and residency patterns, economic exchanges, multireference groups, and power

groups are present.

Combining the work of Augsburger (1992) and Ross (1993b), then, provides a general picture of the culture. But, having identified these basic orientations, the intervener can and should determine the unique mechanisms within each culture that create these overall directions. By discovering a society's unique mechanisms, the researcher gains insight into the behaviors behind the general picture. The mechanisms discovered reveal a culture's distinctive means for peacebuilding and peacemaking. For a researcher and, more specific to this thesis, a third-party intervening in a cross-cultural dispute, these peacebuilding and peacemaking mechanisms are tools for understanding the behavior and perceptions of the disputants, for interacting with the disputants at an "emic" level, and for facilitating agreements and managing the intensity of a dispute. Combining the two levels of inquiry should ultimately assist the researcher in devising a peace methodological construct for the culture in question, concerning a disputant's possible perspective towards behavior in making and building peace.

Notes

[1]   See note eleven in the Introduction for an alternate view to this assertion that culture is a uniquely human trait.

[2]   Ross (1993b) cites several reasons for this, based on the research of others. For example, LeVine (1965) suggests that this occurs because males are dispersed, thus controlling the possibility of disputes among males of the same society (Ross 1993b, 42). But, according Ross's interpretation of Thoden van Velzen and van Wetering (1960), the low internal disputes of matrilocal societies is due to the lack of local organized power groups (Ross 1993b, 42).

Chapter Two

Azande Approaches to Peace, Conflict, and Dispute

Chapter One presented and outlined two cultural studies conducted by conflict and peace studies theorists. By focusing our attention on various consistent behavioral patterns across cultural groups, this research raises many questions about how a people make and build peace. It is my assertion that my proposed method, which grows out of these questions, provides important material for understanding some of the unique ways in which cultural groups build and make peace in their daily community life. In Chapter Two, I aim to come to some understanding about the cultural peacemaking and peacebuilding strategies of the Azande--strategies to which each member adheres and adjusts through a lifetime within that community. With this basic understanding, an outsider can better appreciate the unique perspectives and expectations of a Zande person in a dispute situation.[1]

Evans-Pritchard's research focused on the Azande of the early 1900s. During that time, the tribal lands of the Azande covered the southwestern tip of what is now Sudan, the northern tip of what is now Zaire, and the eastern tip of what is now the Central African Republic (Reining 1966, 1; Baxter and Butt 1953, 11). In his look at the history of the Azande, Reining (1966) notes that the specific country in which a Zande person lived dictated specific governmental approaches towards that person. Subsequently, the Zande culture developed differently, through colonialism, in each country (Reining 1966, xiii). The meticulous research done by Evans-Pritchard (1937, 1962, 1967, 1971, 1974), which is the primary source of my information, focused entirely

on the Azande of Sudan. Evans-Pritchard's research took place in 1926-1930, but focused on the Sudanese Azande of 1905, because this was the time and place of the Gdudwe Kingdom; a kingdom which saw the least changes since colonialism (1937, 18). He did not consider the time difference to be a problem, because the Azande he researched still knew what was traditional and what had changed (1971, 69). Also, extrapolating his work to represent the traditional life of all Zande was plausible, because the language and main institutions were observed to be similar (Evans-Pritchard 1971, 68; 1937, 18). I also rely heavily on the documentation of Baxter and Butt (1953), and Reining (1962). The description of the Azande provided by these authors describes the "traditional" ways of the Zande people, and much of their work is based upon the research of Evans-Pritchard, with supplemental reliance on the diaries of colonialists in the area.

This chapter has three main sections. The first section focuses on a specific, particularly important aspect of the culture, witchcraft magic, and discusses its role in peacemaking and peacebuilding. The second provides a brief exposé on the Zande organization of land and people, and introduces several important Zande peacemaking and peacebuilding components. The third section shows how Zande "facework" is, in itself, a peacebuilding and peacemaking mechanism.

A. WITCHCRAFT MAGIC: A KEY CULTURAL COMPONENT IN PEACEMAKING AND PEACEBUILDING

Witchcraft magic played a vital role in the Zande peacemaking and peacebuilding systems. Indeed, in 1905, the focus of Evans-Pritchard's work, witchcraft entered every aspect of Zande life (Evans-Pritchard 1937, 63). The very values and behaviors to which Zande aspired were

determined by their witchcraft beliefs (Evans-Pritchard 1937, 63).

Witchcraft magic, the Azande believed, stemmed primarily from a person's ill-will towards another person. Ill-will, curiously enough, encompassed those feelings and behaviors which society deemed antisocial and inappropriate, feelings and behaviors such as hatred, envy, jealousy, slander, neglect of obligations, uncharitable and inhospitable behavior, backbiting, greed, resentment, ill-temper, and spite (Evans-Pritchard 1937, 29, 107, 109, 110). Evans-Pritchard states that

> the Zande phrase 'It is witchcraft' may often be translated
> simply as 'It is bad'. For, as we have seen, witchcraft does
> not act haphazardly or without intent but is a planned assault
> by one man on another whom he hates (1937, 107).

It was the combination of anti-social feelings manifested in one person towards another, either as a biological trait or arising from an event, and the presence of a naturally-occurring witchcraft substance in the anti-social person which was believed to cause, by conscious or unconscious design, misfortune for the person to whom these feelings were directed (Evans-Pritchard 1937, 108-111). Although some people were believed to be born without witchcraft substance, a substance in a person said to give him or her witchcraft power, every person was suspect of having the ability of witchcraft magic because proof of the substance's presence in an individual could only be confirmed through autopsy (Evans-Pritchard 1937, 108). As all Azande exhibited these socially inappropriate feelings and behaviors at various points in their lives, every person at some point was accused of witchcraft. Those people who exhibited these behaviors frequently were accused of witchcraft more often as well (Evans-Pritchard 1937, 109). If one's witchcraft substance was accused often enough of causing misfortune, a person received the stigma of being a witch (Evans-Pritchard 1937, 112).

When misfortune befell a person, the victim, if he chose to pursue the matter, immediately compiled a list of those people who showed signs of personal enmity in previous social contacts (Evans-Pritchard 1937, 100, 104). The suspects were almost always the victim's equals; only rarely did accusations of witchcraft cross class or gender (Evans-Pritchard 1937, 32-33, 113). This list was then brought before a "commoner's benge" oracle to confirm the identity of the witchcraft-sender, so that further damage would not occur (Evans-Pritchard 1937, 78, 113). The "benge" oracle was also termed the "poison oracle".[2] It was one of many oracles available to the Zande people for use in guidance, in love, relocation, hunting, and justice among other things. The "benge" was, however, the most reliable oracle, the most expensive, and "by far the most important of the Zande oracles . . . . No important venture is undertaken without authorization of the poison oracle" (Evans-Pritchard 1937, 260-261). The poison oracle used by the non-Avungara Zande was called the "commoner's" oracle and the king's and chief's poison oracle was called the "prince's" oracle. In determining guilt or innocence in court cases, the "prince's" oracle was the most accurate in discerning truth (Baxter and Butt 1953, 56-59). This description of the process and materials involved in taking action against a misfortune, is a brief overview of a more complex process.

In matters of misfortune/disputes caused by witchcraft, the accepted practice of the Azande, if the victim chose to pursue the matter and death had not occurred, was that the witchcraft-sender and victim would treat each other with respect, and follow the prescribed form of conduct; at all costs, each person's "face" must be maintained. Evans-Pritchard states that

> so long as injured party and witch observe the correct forms
> of behavior the incident will be closed without any hard
> words, far less blows, passing between them, and even without
> relations becoming embittered (1937, 87).

Politeness on the part of the victim was expected, because, in many

cases, the assailant was unaware of his or her witchcraft substance and

its action (Evans-Pritchard 1937, 124-125). The victim had the right to

warn the witchcraft-sender of his action, but "you must not insult him

or cause him an injury" (Evans-Pritchard 1937, 87). Thus, indirectness

in the matter was the key. Indeed, indirectness characterized the

entire dispute. The victim learned of the assailant not by directly

confronting the people on his list of possible suspects, but by

consulting the "benge", conducting a seance, or public oration. The

victim, upon confirmation of the assailant by the benge, once again did

not confront the witchcraft-sender directly. Instead, the victim

procured the services of an ally to take the wing of the dead chicken to

the witchcraft-sender and present the wing in private, which confirmed

the witchcraft-sender's guilt in causing the misfortune. Seances

conducted by witches and public orations by a victim were also indirect

methods of informing the witchcraft-sender that his or her work was

known. But in every case, the victim tried to preserve the witchcraft-

sender's "face", by not giving names (Evans-Pritchard 1937, 92): to do

otherwise would disgrace the "face" of the witchcraft-sender, lower the

witchcraft-sender's prestige, infringe upon the witchcraft-sender's

"right to live his life free from molestation," provoke the witchcraft-

sender further, and, subsequently, could affect the "face" of the victim

and incur a court case upon himself for damages (Evans-Pritchard 1937,

87). The witchcraft-sender, on the other hand, was also expected to act

civilly in the matter, provided the victim's approach followed the

prescribed formalities described above (Evans-Pritchard 1937, 87). The witchcraft-sender was usually happy or feigned happiness at being told and accepted the truth expressed by the "benge", because it might prevent further damages which could result in vengeance (Evans-Pritchard 1937, 97); thus, the victim was doing the witchcraft-sender a favor. However, if a witchcraft-sender reacted contrary to the formalized expected behaviors, censorship from the community would result, the witchcraft-sender would be suspect of being a witch, and prestige would be altered (Evans-Pritchard 1937, 87). Again, this provides a brief overview of the process and actions involved in pursuing a misfortune caused by witchcraft.

In the final analysis, the Zande witchcraft beliefs and the prescribed methods for dealing with witchcraft were an elaborate peacemaking mechanism for formally dealing with negative feelings and strained relationships between immediate community members, allowing for their indirect expression and conclusion in the least destructive way (Evans-Pritchard 1937, 84-85). Witchcraft is also an excellent peacebuilding mechanism, because of its role in social control. This institution dictated formal responses people could expect to encounter if they acted contrary to social expectations, thus, acting as a deterrent (Evans-Pritchard 1937, 117). Further to this point, it could prevent dispute-causing action from occurring in the first place;

> since Azande do not know who are and who are not witches,
> they assume that all their neighbours may be witches, and
> are therefore careful not to offend any of them without good
> cause (Evans-Pritchard 1937, 117).

i) Context and the Collective

Context and the collective were key players in all disputes, a

point which finds further support in the section below on law. Context refers to the importance of situational factors preceding a dispute and the fact that it is the violation of group norms not individual ego which determines whether a dispute occurs in a community. Collectivism refers to the role a community plays in sanctioning the victim's and offender's actions throughout the dispute. In the Zande society, it was the violation of group norms which caused a dispute, not personal interpretation. It was the context of the situation which the community judged to determine the legitimacy of a victim's claim of witchcraft causality. Approval for a victim to pursue the witchcraft-sender came only if the context clearly showed no possible reason but witchcraft magic, which then proved that someone had broken or was breaking the norms of the community. Throughout the dispute, the eyes of the community watched the actions of the disputants, ensuring that the formalized actions prescribed by society were followed. Individual creativity and deviation from the form were not tolerated.

Context and the collective played a powerful role in peacemaking and peacebuilding. The reliance on group norms not individual determinations in defining an appropriate dispute limited the possible number of disputes by controlling human actions and perceptions of events. The presence of community built and made peace by its ability to enforce the prescribed rules of acceptable conduct, which, in turn, usually limited violence and feuding.

ii) Human Nature: The Origins of Aggression and Cooperation

My discussion of witchcraft also presents some notions about their understanding of human nature. I propose that because witchcraft was believed to be a naturally occurring phenomenon in humans which could be

inherited, this indicated a belief that aggression originated from biology. Most Azande, in their descriptions of themselves, say they are a terrible people (Evans-Pritchard 1974, 159). Azande recognize themselves as cheats, liars, and practitioners of every form of deceit and duplicity (Evans-Pritchard 1962, 228). Their world is "a world in which what happens is caused by man himself, a somewhat malicious and selfish man, and therefore a hostile world" (Evans-Pritchard 1962, 227). Aggression, not cooperation, was believed to be natural to humans. Cooperation does not seem to exist as a biological characteristic, but is expected and desired within the social context. The Azande might attribute the presence of cooperation to their cultural norms and values which bring order and peace to an aggressive people.

B. ORGANIZATION OF LAND AND PEOPLE

Around the year 1905, there were considered to be three types of Azande: true Zande clans; clans of conquered, previously non-Azande tribes that had totally assimilated in language and custom; and clans of conquered, previously non-Azande tribes that had retained much of their own traditional culture while under Zande rule (Baxter and Butt 1953, 11). With the advent of colonial rule in Sudan, the military organizations of each kingdom disbanded, and the cycle of conquest of non-Azande land--a cycle of expansion, conservation, and assimilation of the conquered--and the cycle of anarchy upon the death of a chief-- leading to schism, fights of successorship, followed by successorship of one or more leaders leading to reassembling the people and further conquest--stopped (Baxter and Butt 1953, 22-23). Zande land and people were once organized and governed by a hierarchy of domains, each of which was under the authority of a male (Baxter and Butt 1953, 48-49).

At the most macro level was the kingdom, ruled by a king from the ruling Avungara clan (Evans-Pritchard 1937, 15). The king's function was "the conduct of offensive and defensive wars and the maintenance within a kingdom of peace, justice, and security" (Evans-Pritchard 1971, 168). Prior to colonization, each king had a standing army of unmarried men and a reserve army of married men (Evans-Pritchard 1971, 236). Military maneuvers, according to Evans-Pritchard's accounts, involved both raids on other Zande kingdoms for women, booty, and greater control of Zandeland and people, and conquests of other tribal lands to expand the kingdom (1971, 235). In his court, the king was the ultimate authority and held the position of highest prestige requiring all Azande people to subordinate themselves in his presence (Baxter and Butt, 55).

In matters of justice, the kings and chiefs were expected to follow and apply the law in matters of determining guilt, innocence, and punishment (Baxter and Butt 1953, 56). In their application, however, kings and chiefs were not always objective: "Offences, in which a chief [or king] was personally concerned[such as disloyalty or adultery involving one of his wives,] were settled summarily by the chief [or king] in his own interest" (Baxter and Butt 1953, 55). Since the lower courts reflect the king's and chief's courts, I deduce that customary law and personal conclusions were also present in the homestead courts. The use of customary law makes these forms of courts adjudication intervention, but the application of personal judgment also makes it arbitration intervention. Evidence suggests that courts were mostly controlling in nature, leading predominantly to a dominant/imposition outcome, according to the meaning of the terms put forward by Katz and Lawyer (1993, 13-17). Since 1905, the authority of the king and chief

in matters of justice was greatly usurped by the British colonialists (Reining 1966, 18). The kings and chiefs still held court, but under supervision and they could no longer punish severely and handle more heinous crimes like murder (Reining 1966, 18).

For administrative reasons, a kingdom was portioned into provinces (Evans-Pritchard 1971, 122). The land and people within each province were governed by and subjugated to a chief (Evans-Pritchard 1937, 14; Baxter and Butt 1953, 48). Chiefs were usually sons or brothers of the king; only rarely were they rich commoners (Evans-Pritchard 1937, 14). Essentially, each chief ruled his province like the king ruled his kingdom, operating his own court and administrating economics, peace, justice, and security (Baxter and Butt 1953, 49).

Similarly, each province was portioned out into various homesteads, tracts of land settled and cultivated by a family unit (Baxter and Butt 1953, 49).[3] In order for a young man to change status into that of an adult and to act rightfully as a legal entity in community and personal affairs, separated from the legal 'apron strings' of his father, the young man's father had to choose for him an appropriate wife and to provide the bridewealth (Baxter and Butt 1953, 68, 73; Evans-Pritchard 1937, 16). Marriage, then, gave the young man the right to establish a homestead. Having a homestead, a man could take charge of his own affairs--such as economy, disputes, and family court--and begin his sphere of influence and accumulated wealth:

> The real wealth was in women, and a rich man was one who had
> many wives, and this was the same whether he was noble or a
> commoner. The more the wives the more the labour and the
> more the food; the more the food the greater the hospitality;
> the greater the hospitality the greater the following; and
> the greater the following the greater the prestige and
> authority (Evans-Pritchard 1971, 223).

Having a homestead did not automatically grant a person total independence. For example,

> a man who is not able to afford poison [for the poison oracle] is not a fully independent householder [in the eyes of the community], since he is unable to initiate any important undertaking and is dependent on the goodwill of others to inform him about everything that concerns his health and welfare (Evans-Pritchard 1937, 283-284).

A married man who could afford the poison and sponsor his own oracle reading was more independent, because, among other things, he was able to solve his own problems and take part in matters of public importance (Evans-Pritchard 1937, 283). Women remained under the control of men, whether single or married. While a woman was single, her father was in control; when she married, her husband controlled her (Evans-Pritchard 1937, 16; Baxter and Butt 1953, 47). Until a man attained a homestead he, too, was under the control of his father (Evans-Pritchard 1937, 16).

Thus, the father or husband was the authority and all family members subjugated to him. He assumed the responsibilities of economy, peace, justice, security, and all other family matters (Reining 1966, 45-46). As well, he held court in matters of strife involving family members and other dependents of his homestead. The data suggests that only in matters of spousal disputes could a husband's or wife's father serve as judge-arbiter, and then only when the wife or husband brought it to the father's court (Evans-Pritchard 1974, 46). Otherwise, those living in other homesteads, including clan members, had no part in the administrative duties of a man's homestead (Evans-Pritchard 1937, 15).

Indeed, clans held limited power in unifying Zande people (Baxter and Butt 1953, 65; Evans-Pritchard 1937, 15). Ultimately it was political affiliation with the chief, and, even more important, with the king that unified the Azande of each kingdom (Evans-Pritchard 1937, 15).

A Zande person's social boundaries were those of the province and kingdom in which he or she lived. To leave those boundaries meant affiliating with a new group despite the fact that clans spanned the different kingdoms (Baxter and Butt 1953, 65; Evans-Pritchard 1937, 15). A Zande person who switched provinces or kingdoms had to affiliate with the chief or king rather than his fellow clan members in the new land (Baxter and Butt 1953, 65). Clan affiliation, however, played an important role in daily interactions, as we saw in the section on witchcraft and will see in this section.

The Azande obviously revered male independence and power, beginning with the establishment of a homestead. But despite this need to act and to be perceived as independent, there were strong peacebuilding and peacemaking influences in the society. The encouragement of alliances and the expected maintenance of obligations to kin and other allies, for example, were key components in forging a more peaceful coexistence and ensuring a reestablishment of peace when disputes inevitably occurred.

i) Gender Roles in Justice

Judging by the apparent superiority of males in this society, a further discussion of gender roles in justice drawing on Augsburger's (1992) work, is in order. Augsburger (1992) brought to our attention that gender differences in disputes and justice were inevitable in all cultures. This was certainly the case in the 1905 Azande culture. Women's and men's roles in matters of justice were polar opposites. Men had authority over women in all areas of life, from economic leadership to marriage decisions (Evans-Pritchard 1937, 16). This superiority of men over women started at a very young age. Boys were allowed to beat

their sisters, if warranted, and showed no respect to older sisters

through subjugation, because sisters were of a lower status than

brothers (Evans-Pritchard 1974, 88). The ethnographic evidence suggests

that the general authority of men over women stemmed from the view that

> 'women are stupid, they are like fools and children. They
> do not think deeply, their thought is shallow, like the tip
> of a little finger. A man tells his wife what she must do
> and she consents to what he has said. Then she goes away,
> and another man tells her not to do what her husband has told
> her to do . . . and she changes her way of looking at things,
> disobeying her husband and obeying her lover. Women are
> totally unstable.' (Evans-Pritchard 1974, 120-121).

Adult women were believed to be easily swayed in their decisions,

fickle, deceitful, and had no sense. The attitude of Zande men towards

the women was also expressed in the following:

> 'If you[, a man,] bother to reply to women's nagging and
> gossip your mouth will be tired to no purpose.' So women
> would quarrel and pour out their pent up anger on the man
> and speak to him very roughly, but he would take no notice
> of them. He would speak only about very important disputes
> (Evans-Pritchard 1974, 181).

Whether this is an attitude held by both sexes is unclear, because

the data does not present evidence suggesting that women thought this of

themselves as well. The fact remains that the positions of women in

society--as daughters, wives, and mothers--were not imbued with any

cultural significance in the determination of justice. One exception

may be a woman's limited role as one of several witches conducting a

seance. However, even in seances the other male witches held more

dominant roles. Women, as a rule, relied on male kin to intervene in

disputes in the public arena and never assumed the role of judge-

arbiter. Evans-Pritchard provides a single example of a woman taking

her own case before the public court; thus, a woman could, on rare

occasions, represent herself (1974, 56). However, if a woman wanted to

expose the truth about her case by using the "benge" oracle--the ultimate intervention tool in matters of justice--then, without exception, she would choose a male kin to take her case before this oracle (Evans-Pritchard 1937, 32). The power of the "benge" was believed to be negated when conducted in the presence of a woman. Thus, women were barred from operating the most important tool for concluding disputes justly. Although women had no legal rights and were considered to be mere property of the male, they were entitled to certain dignities. A woman's father or husband took an attack of any kind against their women as a personal attack against himself and took the dispute to its conclusion (Baxter and Butt 1953, 55).

In private matters, at the family or homestead level, a woman presented her own case before her father or father-in-law in matters of spousal quarrels; otherwise the husband and wife dealt with their problems by themselves. For example, Evans-Pritchard provides an situation of a wife who acted improperly to her husband (she refused sexual intercourse) and the husband took the issue to his father-in-law (1974, 37-47). When dissatisfied with his father-in-law's justice, the husband took the issue to a higher court. This example also shows that a dissatisfied claimant could go to higher courts. Again, if the wife sought better justice, she would then seek the aid of a male kin to represent her in the public courts. In matters of court, no literature disputes a woman's right to appear as a witness.

The whole issue of gender in justice presents some very clear trends in Azande peacemaking. Among these people, the married males filled the roles of judge-arbiter, messenger, plaintiff, defendant, avenger, and other third-party positions: all key positions in restoring

the peace of a community. This presence of male dominance in the public sphere and of male control of key institutional powers of the society, supports Augsburger's (1992) review of and Ridd and Callaway's (1986) statement concerning general trends in gender roles across cultures; a point reviewed in Chapter Two. Given the Zande trends of male dominance, it is not surprising that discrimination, defined from a "western" perspective, occurred against women in formal and informal peacemaking events. I submit, however, that women still had some form of representation and justice, even if retribution was accomplished indirectly through a male. Indeed, the type of justice experienced by women was also secured for those considered inferior to married males, such as unmarried males.

ii)   Law: Recourse and Court Process

     Although the Zande courts were the main formalized methods of Zande third-party intervention, disputants had a number of other recourses at their disposal. Augsburger (1992), in his discussion of disputes in "traditional" cultures, notes that courts of law were usually not the first option for resolving disputes. Indeed, for the Azande, most disputes were avoided; In most cases the victim

> is a philosopher and knows that in life the ill must be
> taken with the good. . . .   There is always witchcraft about,
> and you cannot possibly eradicate it from your life . . . .
> Nine times out of ten he[, the victim,] does nothing
> (Evans-Pritchard 1937, 87).

This particular choice of recourse is one of the most important peacebuilding processes of Azande culture, even though Katz and Lawyer (1993) consider avoidance to be the least productive outcome. As the evidence suggests the possible number of disputes that could disrupt relationships and community far outweighed the actual disputes that did

cause disruption. Thus, this philosophical attitude served to limit the level of disputes in the community and built an atmosphere of peace among community members. Whether this atmosphere was a facade for true feelings of anger and mistrust produced by these avoidance behaviors or the people were truly able to strike the matter from their mind is unclear. Whatever the case, this philosophy helped control the actions of people, which, in the end, still created a community of fewer disruptive disputes than what was possible.

When, however, avoidance was not employed and a victim chose to "confront" the victimizer, recourse was dictated by the cause of misfortune and seldom involved the formal court process. According to Evans-Pritchard, most misfortunes were attributed to witchcraft unless there was strong evidence suggesting, from the context of the situation or confirmation from the poison oracle (1937, 64), that "incompetence, breach of a taboo, and ignorance may be selected as causes" (1937, 78), because "it sometimes happens that the social situation demands a common-sense, and not a mystical, judgment of cause" (1937, 74). Indeed, a person may also try to blame, for example, his or her lying, deceiving, stealing, and adulterous actions on witchcraft (Evans-Pritchard 1937, 74). In such nonwitchcraft cases, where people would inappropriately blame misfortune on witchcraft and try to lay blame on another or avoid being blamed for a crime, the community, as discussed above, intervened and judged the merits of each claim. Along with the intervention of the community was the "benge", which was used often in matters of discerning truth and reliability of evidence in disputes. If the community and/or the "benge" negated a person's attempts at pursuing a particular dispute by laying blame on witchcraft, thus blaming someone

else, the person dropped the issue or the accuser would be seriously ridiculed; and the person attempting to avoid being justly blamed for a criminal act would receive his or her due punishment. The community and "benge", thus, served as another key component in peacebuilding and peacemaking. Again, the role of the community served as a filter for justifying or condemning the behaviors of individuals. In regards to the "benge," it served to build peace by acting as a deterrent for those who might make false statements; the "benge" would, in the end, expose them. It also served to make peace by exposing false accusations and stopping faked disputes.

In matters of nonwitchcraft offences, where the victim was damaged due to such things as lying, cheating, adultery, etc., and the victim chose to pursue the matter, it was legally possible to take matters into one's own hands and assault the victimizer. However, people were encouraged to consult with the courts and community prior to taking such action. This could, however, be done without court or community approval. In order to do this the victim had to first consult the "benge" if evidence was too circumstantial, to determine the assailant and, if needed, justify his actions to the community. Evans-Pritchard documents a statement by a Zande, who related to him how a husband would avoid the court and kill or mutilate a man who slept with his wife (1974, 130). Obvious nonwitchcraft offences did not always lead to assault or court; another alternative was for the victimizer to automatically and immediately compensate the victim. This might occur, for instance, in a breach of obligation or of taboo. In the words of a Zande man, "should I see my sister's nakedness I would compensate her" (Evans-Pritchard 1974, 108).

In nonwitchcraft dispute situations several alternate noncourt recourses of action were available. Taking expedient and often violent retribution against a perpetrator does not promote a peaceful conclusion to a dispute. However, expedient action does prevent a dispute from dragging on, a situation disliked by these people possibly because of its disruptive nature to the community. In these cases the community considered the matter closed if the retribution was sanctioned by the benge and the community agreed with the action. Recompense by the victimizer is an obvious peacemaking mechanism. By allowing such action, these people encouraged quick resolution to a dispute. It also prevented an escalation of a dispute into something more violent and disruptive to the community. These actions follow Katz and Lawyer's (1993) "control" process, producing a "dominance/imposition" outcome. (See the Introduction for a review of these terms.)

For the most part, however, misfortunes were thought to be caused by witchcraft. In such cases, a victim could not take legal action for compensation against or personally assault the witchcraft-sender if the victim chose to pursue the matter; the courts would not become involved and vengeance was not sanctioned by the community (Evans-Pritchard 1937, 85). Other, more indirect, means had to be used, as presented in the section on witchcraft. The peacemaking function of the politeness required in this situation is evident; the deterrence of violent actions stopped a dispute from escalating and enforced a conduct conducive to a quick peaceful conclusion. This recourse fits Katz and Lawyers (1993) "collaborative" strategy, creating a "compromising" outcome. If, however, the dispute involved a death by witchcraft, the victim's kin were encouraged to consult the prince's "benge" to confirm the identity

of the witchcraft-sender. In situations in which the victim died, customary law allowed kin and/or blood-brothers to continue the dispute till vengeance, by death or material compensation, was achieved. If the witchcraft-sender murdered a second time, or murdered an important person, then, and only then, would the prince permit execution. Otherwise, material compensation was the penalty. Indeed, the victimizer's kin and blood-brothers could from the outset of the dispute legally provide material compensation for the death to avoid violent retribution (Evans-Pritchard 1974, 34; Baxter and Butt 1953, 55). However, the victim's kin could choose to avoid the court and/or ignore the gifts of compensation and kill the victimizer, again, so long as the benge was consulted. This act of vengeance by death is, again, not a peaceful peacemaking solution to a dispute, but it brought a quick end to the matter minimizing the disruption to relationships and the community. So long as the benge or evidence proved the guilt of the person upon whom retribution was exacted, then counter-reprisals did not occur because the benge does not lie. The possibility of compensation is a more peaceful peacemaking mechanism, allowing for a nonviolent means to conclude a potentially violent situation. These actions and conclusions again reflect a "controlling" process and "imposition" ending, according to Katz and Lawyer's (1993) definition of the terms.

Despite these possible recourses, however, Baxter and Butt (1953, 55) and Evans-Pritchard (1937, 26) make strong suggestions that more often than not victims preferred recourse through the courts when possible; compensation could fulfill one's pious duty to avenge a wrong while increasing personal wealth and, subsequently, status, whereas taking personal action only fulfilled one's pious duty.

During a court session the judge-arbiter had total control over all activities in his court. The disputants presented their evidence under the direction and questioning of the third-party. Evidence could also include the testimonies of witnesses, who were questioned by the third-party. Under the law, circumstantial evidence was admissible (Evans-Pritchard 1937, 267). In situations where indisputable evidence was available, the judge-arbiter made an immediate ruling without the need of his benge and enforced it (Baxter and Butt 1953, 56-57). However, in most cases, neither indisputable nor circumstantial evidence were available. Thus, consulting the benge of the king or chief, the final authority in determining guilt or innocence, was crucial in settling disputes and determining if the third-party should acquit or punish.

Thus, the availability of informal homestead courts and formal princes's courts served as another important mechanism for peacemaking in the Zande society. First, its tendency to grant material compensation helped to curb the level of violence in disputes, curtailing the escalation of emotions and behaviors. Secondly, its ever-present availability to disputants granted them the opportunity to solicit an objective ear, thus, controlling a situation in which emotions were high and a clash of opinions was inevitable. Thirdly, the princes's courts's expedient and binding verdicts limited the duration of disputes, thus, limiting its disruption to community life, and stopping disputes from gaining momentum and possibly encompass a wider circle of people and causing ever violent actions.

The presence of multiple recourse actions available in resolving disputes outside of the more formal chief's and king's institutional

courts of law, and the avoidance of more formal court action when witchcraft, the greatest cause of disputes, was involved, reflects Augsburger's (1992) statements about "traditional" uses of court. To repeat, Augsburger (1992) notes that "where familial, tribal, and communal controls [and, I might add, intervention,] are strong, law is weak" (1992, 192). Indeed, the greater desire for and cultural encouragement for third-party intervention over personal action in disputes--whether it be the "benge", kin, blood-brother, and possibly others--also supports Augsburger's (1992) suggestion that intervention practices are preferred in "traditional" cultures.

iii) <u>Alliances, Cross-Cutting Ties in a Kingdom, and Reinforcing Ties between Kingdoms</u>

Perhaps one of the greatest peacebuilding and peacemaking components in the 1905 Zande culture was their application of various alliance mechanisms and their adherence to the many obligations that accompanied them. This discussion elucidates the unique cultural mechanisms created to forge and maintain relationships and also assists in determining their structural organization, both based in Ross's (1993b) work.

Kin relationships, along with exogamy, polygyny, blood-brotherhoods, and the ceremony of circumcision, among other practices, helped a Zande man form a vast network of alliances and ties with people in his kingdom, province, and his immediate community. Establishing ties with people in one's kingdom, province, and, most importantly, immediate community were particularly important, because Zande spent most, if not all, of their lives within one province and community, thus, these were the people they came into contact the most. Witchcraft

was believed to be the cause of most misfortune. Since witchcraft was potent across shorter distances, forming allies within those areas one frequented the most could prevent misfortunes or, at least, curtail the number of misfortunes experienced (Evans-Pritchard 1937, 37). Further, allies ensured assistance in time of need. Travelling within the wider kingdom (or foreign lands), warranted other allies to ensure personal safety. The prevalence of these and other alliances within Azande culture supports Ross's (1993b) use of structural theory. Alliances were mechanisms which promoted a cross-cutting ties organization within kingdoms. The prevalence and intricacy of these ties became more intense and numerous moving from the kingdom level down to the local community level. On a larger scale, looking at all of Zandeland, reinforcing ties were evident, as each king formed political alliances with his constituents to form his kingdom.

All alliances discussed in this chapter, whether prescribed by birth or ascribed by calculated action, were held together by a practice of reciprocal obligation. Reciprocal obligations helped ensure a cooperative relationship in times of peace and dispute. Mauss's (1967) work discusses the role of gift-giving in forming and maintaining relationships of any kind. Mauss concludes that these gifts--in this instance gifts of protection, hospitality, food, wives, ceremonial participation, vengeance, labor, etc.--are actually reciprocal obligatory behaviors expected of the allied parties (1967, 10-12). Clearly, the "gifts" the Azande exchanged had an obligatory nature. Evans-Pritchard writes of the blood-brother alliance,

> one asks for a gift or a service in the name of the blood,
> but it is well understood that one's blood-brother in
> presenting the one or performing the other will demand an
> equivalent return in the future. It thus happens that each

> partner keeps a mental tally of the various ways in which
> he has assisted the other. . . and he expects that the tally
> of the other shall be approximately as long as his own
> (1962, 148).

Indeed, these reciprocal obligations apply to all alliances within Zande

society. That sanctions existed to enforce gift giving in alliances

further shows the obligatory nature of actions in alliances. For

example, failure in blood-brother obligations could ultimately lead to

the death of the perpetrator; the Azande believed that the blood of the

other party each person ingested to seal the pact had a specific magic

that would kill the consumer if obligations were broken (Evans-Pritchard

1962, 146-148). Failure could also provoke public insults upon the

offender and denial of entry into people's houses (Evans-Pritchard 1974,

105). And, as with most nonwitchcraft disputes in this culture,

compensation was usually the way to restoring the blood relationship.

For the Azande, maternal and paternal kinship was a primary

alliance mechanism, an alliance which children automatically assumed as

a result of the marriage of their parents. Though obligations were

observed with the mother's kin, greater obligatory observance was

practiced with the father's kin, as one's totem, clan name, and

inheritance was acquired through the male line (Baxter and Butt 1953,

66, 67). Within these relationships, obligations of reciprocal

preferential treatment were expected. Kin were expected to be

hospitable, attend births, marriages, and funeral ceremonies, and follow

specific patterns of addressing kin (Baxter and Butt 1953, 66, 67;

Evans-Pritchard 1974, 87-88).[4] Children were expected to behave in

certain ways around particular relatives as well (Baxter and Butt 1953,

67). But a variety of factors--such as physical distance, long range

descent, and frequency of contact--determined the level of obligatory

behavior expected between two kin (Baxter and Butt 1953, 67).

The act of marriage--an alliance forged between strangers, having no prescribed alliance and obligations--further widened the network of cross-cutting alliances through several practices. Marriage alliances were highly prized, because of the extensive relational ties they created. The importance of marriage alliances is evident in the way Zande carefully guarded it through the obligatory practice of levirate and sororate marriages upon the death of a spouse (Baxter and Butt 1953, 69; Evans-Pritchard 1974, 168-170).[5] Levirate refers to a custom in which a "widow marries a brother of her dead husband" and sororate refers to the custom in which a "widower marries his dead wife's sister" (Haviland [1975] 1987, 211). One custom of Azande marriage which widened the network of allies was exogamy; that is they always married outside their own clan. Since young women or men were forbidden to marry clan members from either the mother's or father's side of the family, each youth was forced to forge an alliance with a strange clan in order to gain a spouse (Baxter and Butt 1953, 66-67). Obligations were, of course, a key ingredient in the creation and maintenance of this highly prized and protected alliance. The alliance bonded the kin and parents of the woman to her husband, with the most intense obligations expected between the husband and her parents (Baxter and Butt 1953, 69-70; Evans-Pritchard 1974, 89-93). There was no evidence describing obligatory behavior between the wife and her in-laws. Further, obligations between the kin of both spouses and between the parents of both spouses was minimal, according to the research. From the outset, the gift of a bridewealth and husband's ongoing assistance in cultivating the wife's parents' vegetable garden began the exchange

of gifts between the husband-to-be and his future in-laws, an exchange which continued in future years. Indeed, the nature of the husband's gifts and his adherence to other obligations largely determined the strength of the husband/in-law relationship.

The second marital custom that encouraged a vast network of cross-cutting ties was the practice of polygyny, a man marrying more than one wife (Baxter and Butt 1953, 69-70; Evans-Pritchard 1974, 147-149). There were many incentives for men to seek several wives: wives "enhanced prestige and status legally and socially" (Baxter and Butt 1953, 70). With each additional wife, a man also obtained an alliance with the kin of his wife, thus, expanding his network of allies. Each additional alliance ensured a larger more diverse group of people in which the husband could call on for support when, for example, payment of a fine was needed. Further, with each wife, a relationship of cooperation was established with more people one came into contact, thus, possibly diminishing the number of misfortunes one experienced (Baxter and Butt 1953, 70).

Like the marriage alliance, blood-brotherhood alliances created strong ties between nonkin people: "The pact is one of mutual assistance and is backed by powerful sanctions" (Evans-Pritchard 1962, 131). The pact and its obligations automatically included the kin of both parties, though the level of obligations was less between the kin of both parties (Evans-Pritchard 1962, 133). According to Evans-Pritchard's research, this practice mostly occurred between two men who were already friends, and gave "to the vague sentiment of friendship, with its indefinite obligations, a status comparable to that of close kin relationship" and "the clear prominent lines of the behavior

patterns which regulate behavior between kin" (1962, 133). Evans-Pritchard noted that this alliance was also made with natives of foreign countries and other districts within Zande territory (1962, 134). By forming a highly formalized relationship with a stranger or nonkin person, such an act ensured cooperation, safety, and could establish commercial ties in strange lands. The obligatory acts towards one another were far-reaching, like those between close kin. The obligations can be summed up by stating that "a man must always support his blood-brother when he is in difficulties, especially when he is in legal difficulties (Evans-Pritchard 1962, 149).[6]

Finally, the ceremony surrounding circumcision also increased one's alliance network. According to Evans-Pritchard's account of the history of Zande circumcision, it was a borrowed custom which became part of the culture at various stages depending upon location (1971, 113).[7] The practice created a life-time bond between the young initiate and his sponsor, and between the kin of each (Baxter and Butt 1953, 74). The obligations predominantly surrounded the steps of the ritual progression of circumcision, and occurred between the sponsor and the initiate's kin. After the ritual was complete, a close bond continued between the parties and their kin (Baxter and Butt 1953, 74).

From these and other alliance mechanisms we can see, to use Ross's (1993b) terminology, the web of cross-cutting ties predominantly within a kingdom, a web which became more elaborate as one moved from the kingdom to community level. These ties assisted in building peace. Alliances provided an impetus and reason for cooperation, lowering the number of disputes. By encouraging the formation of multiple ties with nonkin people, people for whom no prescribed formalized obligatory

action of cooperation and mutual support existed, a cooperative spirit among a greater number of people resulted. This created an atmosphere in which a person would contact few strangers, people for whom there would be no formalized script for interaction. Alliances, thus, made actions and intent in interactions more intelligible, and inclined the participants of an interaction towards a cooperative spirit and positive perception of action and intent. When strangers meet, however, ambiguity concerning motive and proper interaction is the highest, making the encounter emotionally intense (Ross 1993b, 39; Mauss 1967, 82). This ambiguity, coupled with the lack of shared interests, makes the likelihood of cooperation tenuous, and avoidance of or amicable behavior in a dispute remote. By promoting interconnective ties, a great number of disputes and ongoing feuds were diverted, as each person was obligated to cooperate and the establishment of a coalition of supporters was impossible (Ross 1993b, 39). In a sense, alliances also acted as deterrents, another peacebuilding strategy. They curbed the negative feelings and actions of people towards others by the inclusion of prescribed retribution behavior in these alliances and the community's distain for dishonoring an alliance.

Moreover, alliances were also peacemaking mechanisms. The network of allies ensured a number of qualified third-party interveners from whom assistance in concluding a dispute was available (Ross 1993b, 39). Also, the structuring of behavior, determining appropriate action for the allies, limited retaliation and encouraged a quick cooperative solution.

Thus far, I have discussed alliances which predominantly occurred within kingdoms. On a more macro level, a weak political alliance was

forged between the king of each autonomous kingdom and the people living within the kingdom. These political alliances, formed political organizations within Zandeland (Evans-Pritchard 1971, 121). The political alliance of each kingdom was, like the other alliances discussed above, forged and maintained through reciprocal obligations. The chiefs and subjects of each autonomous kingdom,

> owed allegiance to the king and had, with their subjects,
> to obey his summons to war, to keep the peace among them-
> selves, and, though no exact measure was stipulated, to pay
> him tribute in kind from time to time, usually at least
> every year (Evans-Pritchard 1971, 168-169).

I propose that this alliance mechanism was instrumental in forming, at the society level, a loose "reinforcing-ties" organization. "Reinforcing-tie" organizations you recall, are defined by alliances which shape societies into several autonomous core groups. Each member of a core group holds a common interest, an interest which differs from those of other core groups (Ross 1993b, 39). The common interest in each core group was the shared political alliance with a king. However, there was no evidence suggesting that fellow members of a kingdom would unite to protect a member in a dispute with a member of another kingdom, nor was there evidence suggesting that a member could mobilize his or her fellow kingdom members against a person from another kingdom. Their allegiance and, subsequent interests, were directed almost entirely to the king and not to fellow members of the kingdom in which they lived, because the alliance was not between members. It was only the kings who were able to mobilize the core group and lead raids and wars against other Zande kingdoms (Baxter and Butt 1953, 22-25, 48-49). As can be expected, this political alliance provided only a weak link of cooperation and commonality between members of a kingdom. In everyday

life the alliance held few obligations between its members other than disallowing internal wars (Evans-Pritchard 1971, 169).

Travelling out from one's local community into other areas of the kingdom meant contacting fewer people in which close ties through alliances had been maintained. Further, allegiance to the core group or kingdom was weak, as members of a kingdom could move to other kingdoms. Though the kingdom was autonomous, its membership was not necessarily enduring. In Ross's description of a reinforcing tie organization, core groups are autonomous and are united by a unique common interest, two points which were prevalent in the Azande reinforcing ties organization. Ross also describes core groups as consisting of strong, trusting relationships among all its members, a point not evident within the Zande kingdoms. Further, the members of each core group rally around their own in disputes; a key factor which makes disputes in such societies hard to resolve and a point not practiced within the kingdom groups (Ross 1993b, 39). Thus, at the society level loose core groups did exist, however, the reinforcing ties ability to organize people was greatly inferior to the effects of the cross-cutting organization simultaneously taking place.

Despite the weak effect of core groups on the organization of Zande people, it did serve a peacebuilding purpose. The alliance formed between a king and his subjects demanded peace between the king's subjects. This obligation served to curb the outbreak of disputes within the kingdom, promoting an atmosphere of peace.

However, conflicts and disputes still arose despite the presence of many alliances forming a cross-cutting ties organization. Indeed, according to Evans-Pritchard (1937), alliances can, at times, hinder the

settlement of a dispute, as, for example, in public quarrels the kin of
each disputant take their appropriate sides creating greater confusion.
But it is "to the interest of both parties that they should not become
estranged through the incident. They have to live together as
neighbours afterwards and to co-operate in the life of the community"
(Evans-Pritchard 1937, 97). It is not clear whether the cross-cutting
ties encourages other interested parties to push for a quick settlement
between the disputants, or to encourage an escalation of the dispute.
However, these ties possibly limited aggressive action and encourage
quick settlements. Indeed, Ross (1993b) himself classifies Azande as a
culture with low internal and external levels of dispute. This
conclusion reflects, among other factors, the effects of cross-cutting
ties.

iv) Interaction with "Other"

     While this chapter is primarily concerned with Zande perceptions,
dealings, and interactions with "self", the Zande perception and
approach to "other" also deserves some attention. Ross, in his research,
shows how the formation of disposition of "self"--those who belong to a
specific society--and "other"--those who do not belong to that society--
comes to be internalized through socialization and institutions of the
culture (Ross 1993b, 51, 52, 57). "Other", in this instance, refers
predominantly to non-Zande people, but might also apply to Azande who
live in different provinces or kingdoms. He refers to this aspect of
culture as psychocultural, which is the shared dispositions a society
has for perceiving, dealing, and interacting with "self" and "other"
(Ross 1993b, 52, 57). In this case, evaluating the various
socialization and institutional indicators put forward by Ross (1993b)

lies beyond the bounds of this thesis, however, historical literature and my work on alliances provided adequate data to draw some conclusions.

As Mauss suggests, when strangers meet, they can either avoid direct contact, fight, or negotiate a relationship (1967, 82). Ross's (1993b) theory contributes to this by suggesting that in an encounter between strangers, the lack of shared common interest and of a formalized relationship lead to ambiguity in perception and mistrust in intentions which, in turn, make "other" interactions volatile and unpredictable (Ross 1993b, 52). Foreign lands were considered dangerous, hostile, and a threat to one's life (Evans-Pritchard 1962, 134; Singer and Street 1972, 52). Safety in such a place was tenuously secured only when a formalized blood-brother pact was made with a person of the foreign land (Evans-Pritchard 1962,134). Zande history further depicts their violent disposition towards "other". Each Zande kingdom practiced conquest and expansion into foreign land, as well as assimilation of foreign people (Reining 1966, 7; Evans-Pritchard 1971, 22). According to Baxter and Butt some foreign tribes assimilated the Zande culture, while other tribes were treated with hostility and were scorned as savages (1953, 11). This disposition also included a response strategy that made non-Zande targets for aggressive action.

However, despite these perceptions of other, a mechanism for establishing a stable, formal relationship with non-Zande people was available. I refer to their use of the blood-brother alliance. This peacebuilding and peacemaking strategy is an interesting feature of the culture, given their history with other tribes who lived around them.

C. "FACEWORK"

Saving "face" is not only important in situations involving witchcraft magic, but is important in all aspects of Zande life. For example, "facework" strategies in court were vital behavioral patterns which helped build peace within the court proceedings by insisting upon both respect towards the judge-arbiter--who was the disputants' better-- and acceptance of the disputants' inferior position. Facework among the Azande was often an "other-positive" facework strategy. This facework strategy, in keeping with Augsburger's use of Ting-Toomeys definition, "uses certain communication strategies to defend and support the other person's need for inclusion and association" (Augsburger 1992, 89). For the Azande, it upheld important values of the society, such as prestige, gender, age, and marital status. On a more practical level, it helped the third-party maintain order by giving him ultimate respect in objectivity and judgment of disputes and authority in matters of dispensing justice. Facework in the courts of the chief and king took the form of subjugation: disputants would bow to the judge-arbiter, limit their speech, showing signs of embarrassment, and listen and accept the words of the arbiter (Baxter and Butt 1953, 56; Evans-Pritchard 1974, 89-92). By exhibiting these obligatory behaviors, the inferior received approval and affirmation from those present in the court, and ensured a favorable reception of his case by all present. Thus, he maintained his own face in the public, by ensuring a favorable public face for the intervener. Similarly, peacebuilding qualities of other-positive facework were evident in everyday human actions. Fulfilling the obligations which accompanied kin relations also fulfilled each person's face needs. Ignoring or absent-mindedly failing

to fulfill these and other obligations would bring severe penalties.

There were also patterns of behavior during the trial which reflected an other-negative facework approach. Other-negative facework refers to interactive strategies which show respect for the other person's need for autonomy, dissociation, and space (Ting-Toomey cited in Augsburger 1992, 89). Again, the maintenance of these actions secured and built peace, by demanding people act politely, thus, preventing disputants from provoking an escalation in behavior. Indirectness is also a characteristic of this approach. The third-party role, in the Zande courts, was to accept the imposition of requests for a hearing, but the person bringing the case realized the imposition and waited until the judge-arbiter was ready to hear the case (Baxter and Butt 1953, 56). This time of waiting showed respect for the intervener's need for autonomy, freedom, and space by limiting the extent of the imposition, through allowing him to set the time on his own terms, and by symbolically giving the third-party the choice to respond. After the court case, the winner usually gave the judge-arbiter part of the compensation received as payment for inconveniencing him. Further, during the trial a level of indirectness between the disputants was maintained: they spoke to the intervener and presented information to him.

Indeed, in most of life's social interactions, indirectness or concealment through circumlocutors[8] was usually the norm, as anything could trigger a conflict and lead to a dispute (Evans-Pritchard 1962, 228). Since the Azande lived in a world where social hierarchies required subjugation, and where people were considered deceitful and hostile, Evans-Pritchard suggests that circumlocution became a way of

life (1962, 228). Circumlocution was so pervasive as a mode of self-

preservation, that Zande took it for granted

> that what is said means something other than what is said,
> and when he cannot be sure, and even they cannot be sure,
> whether the words do have a nuance or someone imagines that
> they do, or wants to think that they do. One cannot know
> what is going on inside a man (Evans-Pritchard 1962, 228).

With the Azande, indirectness in speech and action was a peacemaking

strategy to avoid personal injury by providing a "backdoor" for the

utterer if something said intentionally or unintentionally was taken

negatively. Evans-Pritchard provides an example in which a man insulted

his wife indirectly by saying 'this stupid dog':

> Were the wife to understand this she would make a row, but
> should she do so then or later, someone in the meanwhile
> having explained it to her, her husband would feign
> innocence, saying that he was speaking only of his dog and
> meant no more than he said (1962, 222).

It is, however, interesting to note that, with the exception of

indirectness--both in and out of court proceedings--almost all of the

characteristics of other-negative facework as outlined by Augsburger

(1992) were absent from Evans-Pritchard's description of Zande culture.

Augsburger states that both other-negative and other-positive facework

are found simultaneously in cultures, but each culture usually has a

preference for one when it comes to disputes (1992, 88). In summary,

then, from the evidence presented, I propose that within disputes, an

other-negative facework strategy is pursued more aggressively than it

would be pursued in everyday peaceful functions of community life. In

all other situations beyond disputes, an other-positive course of

behavior is preferred.

Notes

[1]   "Zande" is an adjective, while "Azande" is a proper noun.

[2]   The benge required the use of a poison, not easily acquired, from an area outside Zandeland, and the possession of chickens. The poison was given to the chickens and the question to be answered was posed to the poison in the chicken. Evans-Pritchard (1937, 258-351) provides a very detailed description of the poison oracle in all its facets, concerning the source of the poison, preparation and use, reading the behavior of poisoned chickens, etc. He also provides an analysis of the many other lesser oracles available for consultation (1937, 352-386).

[3]   At the time of Evans-Pritchard's research in Sudan, Zande were living on settlements, created by Sudanese officials, along government roads to curb the spread of sleeping sickness (Evans-Pritchard 1937, 15).

[4]   For an indepth discussion on addressing patterns between kin, I suggest the reader look at Evans-Pritchard's book, Man and Woman Among the Azande (1974, 87-88).

[5]   This, however, does not suggest that divorce was impossible. Poor treatment of any kind, from inappropriate beating of a wife to improper amount of visitations to a wife's hut to idleness on the part of the wife were all causes for divorce (Baxter and Butt 1953, 70-71; Evans-Pritchard 1974, 33). If divorce was desired by the husband (which was rare) or on the part of the wife's father, then the procedure for marriage was reversed and, in the end, all obligations were void (Baxter and Butt 1953, 70).

[6]   For further clarification on the specific reciprocal duties of blood-brother alliances see Evans-Pritchard's book Essays in Social Anthropology.

[7]   In Sudan, circumcision did not become an integral practice of Zande culture until shortly after 1905 (Evans-Pritchard 1971, 113-114). However, in other areas of Zandeland, the practice had been in vogue for some time prior to 1905.

[8]   According to the data from Evans-Pritchard (1962), the use of circumlocutors is a way of asking or saying something to avoid disputes. If what is said is taken as an offence, the speaker can deny malicious intent and ally with a more innocent meaning. The point is to keep an open line of retreat if offence is taken. Incidentally, not only is speech provided with a double meaning, but also gestures and tone are imbedded with several meanings. Circumlocutors' greatest use was within legal cases, though they do permeate into all areas of life.

Chapter Three

Awlad 'Ali Approaches to Peace, Conflict, and Dispute

This chapter documents the basic peacemaking and peacebuilding
strategies of the Awlad 'Ali, created through centuries of community
cultural development. This Arab Bedouin society, who follow the Islamic
religion, inhabit the Western Sahara of what is now Egypt (Abu-Zeid
1966, 248). The Awlad 'Ali bring a unique perspective to peace,
conflict, and disputes, one which is different than the Azande. This
difference is obvious, despite the fact that, according to David
Augsburger's (1994) general classifications of cultures around the
world, both are considered "traditional" cultures.

The information presented originates from my analysis of the
research of Abu-Lughod (1988), Murray (1935), Nimkoff (1965), Abou-Zeid
(1966), Kennett (1968), and Khalof (1990). In keeping with evidence
that people and, subsequently, cultures constantly adapt to changes in
the immediate environment, the fact that this material is between ten
and seventy years old, compels me to view the material as a
representation of the people as they were in the past.[1] The earlier
works of Kennett (1968) (who actually did his work around the 1920s) and
Murray (1935) in most cases are support by the more recent research.

I have organized the information into three sections. After
outlining the prominent cultural attributes of the honor and modesty
codes, I move to presenting a brief overview of the organization of the
Awlad 'Ali land and people. The third section discusses the "facework"
strategies; an aspect of their culture which affected all parts of life.
Each section discusses the conditions of disputes and peace, put forward

in my method, for this culture. All sections are key in formulating an understanding of Awlad 'Ali peacemaking and peacebuilding behavior.

A. HONOR AND MODESTY CODES: TWO KEY CULTURAL COMPONENTS IN PEACEMAKING AND PEACEBUILDING

Honor and modesty were at the heart of the Awlad 'Ali moral system and crucial for maintaining and building peace (Abu-Lughod 1988, 78). Achieving honor in the community was the goal of both males and females; the honor code was predominantly a code for males, but was followed, where possible, by females and dependents. The modesty code, on the other hand, concerned females primarily but lower status males also followed the modesty code. Through the observance of the moral ideals embedded in these concepts, social status was achieved, behavior was structured, community acceptance was received, face was negotiated, and the boundary between Arab and non-Arab was demarcated. Abu-Lughod writes that

> these codes provide yardsticks by which individuals'
> legitimate rights to hierarchical positions are measured.
> People achieve honor by displaying the honor-linked
> virtues associated with Awlad 'Ali ideals (1988, 166).

These codes structured the behaviors and roles of men and women. The codes also structured the behaviors and roles between family members of a "tent"--the smallest autonomous economic unit--and within and between the multiple politically and economically autonomous camps--groups comprised of the "tents" of many kin and fictitious kin. The extent to which these codes were shaped by the Koran, the holy book of the Islam faith, is not an issue I wish to discuss here. However, the Awlad 'Ali place great emphasis on their Arabic ancestry and on piety. Thus, it would stand to reason that "the Koran remains the fountain head of the true law and true culture, and a summons to submission in every area of

life. The 'secular'--political, economic, and family life--as well as in such conventionally religious matters as how one says one's prayers" (Ellwood [1976] 1987, 297).

Forming the basis of the honor code was the genealogical link to Arab ancestry; a link made more clearly in the following section on organization. Suffice it to say, proof of Arabic descent automatically ascribed to a Bedouin a certain level of moral character, character never ascribed to non-Arabs. A Bedouin's ancestral history also had a bearing on the level of honor (Abu-Lughod 1988, 45). For example, if an ancestor had at some point been a dependent, then this reflected on the honor of his descendents. Autonomy, however, was far more important than lineage and was, in fact, the greatest value (Abu-Lughod 1988, 33, 166). Honor increased or decreased depending on the level of independence, freedom from domination and dependency, and, conversely, the level of control over one's own life and resources (Abu-Lughod 1988, 79). A person could be equal in all other respects to another person, but if equality in autonomy was not present, then the person's social status was of lower value (Abu-Lughod 1988, 79). Lower social status demanded modesty when in contact with those of higher social status. An example of the importance of personal autonomy is born out in the symbolic behavior of their marriage ceremony. Turner (1969, 1974), in his study of ritual process, suggests that the ideals of a society can be revealed through focusing on rituals, more specifically, on the liminal state of rituals.[2] In this second phase of three, the normative expected behaviors and structures of life in the society are removed, creating an atmosphere of nonstructure. As part of the liminal phase of Awlad 'Ali wedding ceremonies, Nimkoff documents that

young men revel in their lewd songs and shout their
obscenities for all to hear. The senior agnates stand
aside and make a show of ignoring the proceedings. And
well they may, for each marriage is a challenge to the
exclusive authority they have enjoyed; each nuptial tent
is an invasion of the domain of which they have been
undisputed masters. Marriage is the only occasion when the
men of one generation can clap and sing their defiance of
an older one, and give warning of the changes which must
be accommodated however great the pretence that nothing
has happened (1965, 131).

The lewd comments and singing near seniors is, in everyday life, a

taboo:

Ordinarily, young men dare not sing within earshot of
their senior agnates. Far from allowing obscenities,
agnates of the ascending generations would not allow even
a mention of women to be made by young men (Nimkoff 131).

Thus, the main action in the liminal state of the marriage ceremony

targeted the issue of autonomy and independence, attesting to the

importance of this issue in society.

Keenly associated with honor was the presentation of a strong

front. Passion, vulnerability, helplessness, impotence, and passivity

were suppressed and fearlessness and courage were displayed when

challenged (Abu-Lughod 1988, 46, 147-148). To show emotional attachment

to another person, including one's spouse, showed weakness and

dependence upon another person (Abu-Lughod 1988, 47-49). Furthermore,

men can forfeit their positions of responsibility as
independent providers by coming to depend on women to
gratify their sexual desires. Women, not to mention others,
lose respect for such men, and may use this dependence to
their advantage, thus reversing accepted hierarchical
relations between men and women (Abu-Lughod 1988, 148).

Also, when physical or verbal injury was incurred by an equal in a

dispute, an injury that was interpreted as a challenge to one's honor,

the injured person was stoic, and refused to admit to pain (Abu-Lughod

1988, 90); showing pain demonstrated both a lack of control over

emotions and the assailant's control over the victim's body. Instead, the victim either counterchallenged or showed no concern for the attack (Abu-Lughod 205).

The honor code also dictated several other characteristics. An honorable person was generous, honest, sincere, and loyal to friends (Abu-Lughod 1988, 87). Such a Bedouin kept his or her word, was fearless in fighting, courageous, protected the weak, sought justice, was assertive, never stepped down from a challenge, and was wealthy. In regards to their Islamic religion, an honorable Bedouin must pray and follow all the pious traditions practiced by their religion.

Females also wanted to meet the expectations of the honor code, but, due to Bedouin ideas regarding women's inadequacies in controlling personal sexuality, they were automatically relegated to a lower status of morality; a woman's inability to control her menses, connected with fertility and sex, showed a lack of control over her own body. Though menses might not be physically seen by others, the effects were. For example, during this time a woman was considered impure and unable to keep up her prayer obligations, and, thereby, suffered a decrease in piety. Further, a woman's inability to cover up her pregnancy, an obvious sign of sexuality and fertility, displayed lack of both control and honor. Thus, women were considered naturally morally inferior to most men (Abu-Lughod 1988, 118). There were some recognized situations in which a woman could technically exceed the honor of a man. Abu-Lughod wrote that "some men or categories of men (dependents such as young and lowly men) are more deferential than some women (older women and women from important families)" (1988, 118). However, a woman would likely never exceed men who do not fit in the dependence category. It

was a part of a woman's honor to fulfill the modesty code.

Women could, however, achieve a certain level of honor in two ways. First, they could meet those requirements of the honor code that were attainable. This even included control over sexuality when possible (Abu-Lughod 1988, 79). For instance, a woman would control and dismiss passion and desire for her husband (Abu-Lughod 1988, 153). Second, women would fulfill the modesty code which involved expected behavior in the presence of social superiors or strangers. A modest woman must act chastely, deny sexual interests, avoid nonkin men, and veil appropriately in public (Abu-Lughod 1988, 152). A woman must also be shy, shameful, lower her head, and limit speech in the presence of superiors or strangers. In summary, a woman must be self-effacing (Abu-Lughod 1988, 153). Certain aspects of the modesty code also applied to some men, such as young males and dependent clients. Essentially, the modesty code applied to males when they were in the presence of or interacting with a social superior. All these modest acts signified the shameful position a person had in the community because of his or her inability to meet the community's ideals (Abu-Lughod 1988, 157). Since there were graded levels of honor, there were also graded levels of shame that must be portrayed in the community: "Not just individuals but whole categories of unequals avoid each other" (Abu-Lughod 1988, 115-116). The level of shame is in direct correlation with the level of honor achieved. The less honor the more shameful one must be, and vise versa.

With both the honor code and modesty code being pursued by women and other dependents, there was a potential clash of ideals. If autonomy was the greatest virtue of the honor code, how could dependents

achieve any honor if they must be dependent and act modestly? The Awlad 'Ali's solution to this was for dependents to voluntarily give up their autonomy (Abu-Lughod 1988, 105).

If a person failed to keep the honor code and/or act modestly, their honor would decrease, and, subsequently, status and position within the community would diminish (Abu-Lughod 1988, 92). To act dishonorably brought shame upon the person. The community would gossip, ridicule, act disgusted, and ultimately treat him or her in a way indicative of the lowered status obtained. In turn, the dishonored person would act in an appropriate manner for the new position he or she had obtained.

i. Context and the Collective

Context, again, refers to the importance of the situational factors preceding a dispute and the importance of group norms in defining the legitimacy of one's reaction to the situation. Collectivism refers to the need for group approval and sanctioning of one's actions in a situation. As described in the section on "facework" in more detail, a person's "face" was negotiated with the community, and was based upon a person's behavior when interacting with other members and in specific events. It was the communities perception and judgment of these actions, that brought honor or shame to the person and provided a social place in the community. The change that occurred from individual determination of reprisals to the need for community approval before an individual could avenge a challenge, attests to this collectivism and context.[3] Thus, in a dispute where, for instance, someone's honor was challenged by an equal in social status, the community judged the appropriateness or inappropriateness of the dispute

and the actions of the disputants as they tackled the problem. If, for example, the community perceived that the challenged did not meet the challenge satisfactorily according to the honor code, the victim lost honor in the community. It is "considerations of kinship, [which] control the behavior and attitudes of the people and determine their social standing" (Abou-Zeid 1966,250).

The community's prominent role in the monitoring and legitimizing or illegitimizing of behavior is a key component of both peacemaking and peacebuilding. As suggested earlier, with the whole community as a "watchdog" on behavior, individuals would more then likely think twice about the legitimacy of their actions before entering a dispute. This avoided some disputes altogether. Further, community involvement could also control the level of reprisals and violence in a dispute, by, again, making the disputants think about appropriate behavior instead of acting on feelings and impulse. It is the community that could make or break one's honor.

B. ORGANIZATION OF LAND AND PEOPLE

The Awlad 'Ali clans formed a major subtribe within the Sa'adi tribe of Cyrenaica, and moved to inhabit the Western Sahara of what is now Egypt (Abou-Zeid 1966, 248). The Awlad 'Ali subtribe had a rather complex tribal organization consisting of many tribes and multiple levels of subtribes (Abu-Lughod 1988, 50).[4] In many respects, the Awlad 'Ali tribe is a microcosm of the larger Sa'adi tribe. The Awlad 'Ali were, and to some extent still are, a Bedouin culture.[5] According to Kennett, the term "Bedouin" is an Arabic word meaning "original" and refers also to nomadic desert-dwellers (1968, 1).

The smallest recognized autonomous social and economic unit within

these tribes was the people who lived under the same tent (Abou-Zeid 1966, 251). It was "the people of the tent", a direct translation of the Arabic word "beit", that formed the fundamental basis of social organization (Abou-Zeid 1966, 248). The oldest male of each tent and usually the one most closely reflecting the honor code held total authority over resources belonging to his "tent"--children, wives, dependents, and other tent-related activities. It was the oldest male who, among other things, was hospitable to and protected guests, and who made compensatory payments for wrongs committed by those under his tent and within his camp. The authority of the father over his children extended into adulthood. Son(s) were under his authority even after marriage and their own tent had been constructed (Nimkoff 1965, 129; Abu-Lughod 1988, 149, 150). Son(s) still relied on their father for sustenance and took care of their father's flocks, a symbol of their dependence on and their lower social status to him. However, the establishment of a tent initiated the male's climb in acquiring and meeting the dictates of the honor code, in this case authority over dependents and greater autonomy. A newly established tent brought control over some resources--wife, children, dependents, and other materials (Nimkoff 1965, 129, 130). Along with building a family and acquiring dependents, males gained higher social status through inheriting a dead father's herds (Abou-Zeid 1966, 249). Wealth was determined by herd size, with increasing wealth a man could be more generous, and, subsequently, more hospitable. Generosity and hospitality were important attributes in determining the moral worth of a person, which subsequently determined his level of social status and political function in society. For example, in order to be considered a

likely candidate to act as a third-party in disputes, a revered position, a man had to have wealth and social status.

Women were always first under the authority of their father and then paternal male kin, even after marriage (Abu-Lughod 1988, 59). This position, again, is due to a woman's lower achievement of the honor code. In marriage, they were also under the authority of their husband, though ultimate allegiance was to their father and his kin. For a woman, independence grew with the death of each eldest male paternal kin to which the woman belonged, and as a result of menopause. Thus, for females, a tent only meant coming under the rule of another male(s), though having children did fulfill one of her roles as a female, a role that could only be fulfilled upon marriage.

Camps, the next step up from the tent level and the prominent group in Awlad 'Ali organization, were formed for political and military power. Such is the case because through large numbers of people a tent and camp could better protect their autonomy, stave injustice, and ensure achievement of personal interests (Abou-Zeid 1966, 251). Camps consisted of the tents of dependents and kinspeople. Dependents were nonkin who had chosen to work, to seek protection, and/or to use the land and wells of a specific tent and of the camp. The dependents were under the authority of the camp leaders and, more specifically, the head of the tent to which the dependents chose to attach themselves. The tents of kin living within a camp or corporate group were genealogically linked "through [a paternal] ancestor going back five ascending generations from living males of about twenty years of age" (Nimkoff 1965, 140). Each camp held rights to its own land and wells (Abu-Lughod 1988, 79, 80). The resources of the camp constituted many other things,

including the people of the camp, but it did not include the herds owned by each tent. For example, in most cases of tent politics, the camp did not intervene. However, the camp would usurp the authority of the male head of a tent if a matter effected the camp as a whole. Nimkoff states that a head could punish his son physically for an infraction, but

> he may not do so to the point of injury, for personal
> injury comes within the legitimate sphere of the corporation.
> A man's 'bone' belongs to his group; he is an integral part
> of 'the one body'; events which affect a man in this context
> lie outside a father's field of jurisdiction (1965, 127-128).

The allegiance ties within the camp structure, based on paternal lineage and fictitious kin, were the strongest and closest, forming many autonomous, tightly knit groups of people within Awlad 'Ali society. For example, a woman who married outside her father's camp would support her father's camp in a dispute between the camps of her husband and father (Abu-Lughod 1988, 54, 59). Because of these strong allegiances, it was of greatest advantage for women and men to marry endogamously; that is, young men and women were encouraged to marry within their own camp, and more specifically, to marry their patrilineal cross-cousin(s) (Abu-Lughod 1988, 6). For a woman, it allowed her camp to protect and watch her. For a man, it allowed his camp to protect its own interests by not bringing outsiders whose interests were with another camp (Abu-Lughod 1988, 57-58). Exogamy, marrying outside one's camp, however, did occur.

Within this microcosm of Awlad 'Ali culture called the camp existed a certain organizational structure among the members; a structure based on the honor code and lineage. The ruling elders of the camp usually belonged to the dominant core family, whose tent was found in the middle of the camp; peripheral families fanned out from the core

tents based on level of kinship to the core group (Abu-Lughod 1988, 6).[6]
With elder males being the leaders, junior males deferred to these and
other seniors in much the same way that dependents and females deferred
to males of higher social status (Abu-Lughod 1988, 80, 86, 155, 157).

The data suggests that, along with the leadership present in the
tents and camps, each level of tribe also had a leader (Murray 1935, 41;
Kennett 1968, 13; Abu-Lughod 1988, 80). These tribal leaders did not
usurp the leadership of the camps, because the camps were recognized as
more important politically than tribes (Murray 1935, 40). Murray
describes the function of tribal leaders as "petty sheikhs" who dealt
with matters of transactions between tribes or with the outside world,
and were expected to act at the highest moral level (1935, 41-42). Like
tent and camp leaders, tribal leaders also intervened in disputes. They
convened the closest thing to an institutional court of law available in
this culture, and acted as judge-arbiter in these situations.[7] These
courts were not permanent fixtures of society, but convened only if the
disputants mutually agreed and requested it. Awlad 'Ali third-party
intervention was predominantly adjudication with some arbitration.
Sheikh(s) acting as interveners practiced some level of arbitration in
order to preserve the honor of both sides. Like all other leaders,
tribal leaders also intervened in noncourt disputes. The more formal
courts follow more closely Katz and Lawyer's (1993) process of
"controlling" with some "compromising," and the courts conclusion was
mostly "dominance" with some "compromising," as discussed in the
Introduction to this thesis.

Lineage was the key component which created this segmentary-
lineage organization. However, lineage also formed the distinction

between all Bedouin and non-Bedouin people. For the Awlad 'Ali, for example, all members of each camp and members of ascending levels of tribes could trace a common paternal ancestor, which linked them all to the Awlad 'Ali tribal name, then to the larger Sa'adi tribe, and ultimately to Arab ancestry (Abou-Zeid 1966, 248; Abu-Lughod 1988, 79). This differentiation between Bedouin and non-Bedouin was based on the belief that their paternal lineage linked them to the first followers of Mohammed, thus making them the first and true Arabs (Abou-Zeid 1966, 251; Abu-Lughod 1988, 44, 13). This gave the Awlad 'Ali the purest bloodline among other Arab groups. The purer the blood, the more honorable and moral the person and the people (Abou-Zeid 1966, 251). For these people, lineage formed the key distinguishing marker between "self" and "other", giving a place within the group to those who had proven common ancestral links (Abu-Lughod 1988, 49, 51). According to their beliefs and perspective, having no kinship relationship with Bedouins meant having no Arab blood, and having no Arab blood meant the person had little honor or moral worth. This was their perception of non-Arabs, because non-Arabs did not follow the honor code in daily living which determined a person's moral and social status. Non-Arabs were the most "other," or strange, a Bedouin person could encounter. Thus, lineage not only created structures of "self" and "other" between Bedouin camps and tribes, but also served as a yardstick for measuring membership into Bedouin society. And with the acceptance or rejection of membership into Bedouin society, based on lineage, also came a structured form of perceptions, emotions, and sentiments which managed everyday relations between Bedouin and non-Bedouin (Abu-Lughod 1988, 32, 50).

i) <u>Gender Roles in Justice</u>

Augsburger (1992) notes a key factor in understanding the law of any given culture. He suggests that, in matters of law, males and females are usually assigned different roles in peacemaking and peacebuilding processes. Since the roles assigned to each sex are unique to each culture, they must be discovered anew with each culture. Augsburger (1992) also notes that the law and the possible institutions of law tend to hold different roles (if any role) depending on whether the culture is "traditional" or "modern".[8] As the peace strategies discussed here indicate, Awlad 'Ali fall under Augsburger's "traditional" category, consequently there are more preferable recourses available to disputants in this culture, as in other "traditional" cultures, other than the use of agents and institutions of law (1992, 192).

The codes of expected conduct and roles for each sex in matters of peacemaking and peacebuilding were founded in the honor code. In review, because of the expectations put forth by this code, women were crippled in their ability to embody the ideals of the code due to natural causes, such as menstruation and pregnancy. However, men had no natural impediments stopping them from obtaining the ideals, or at least obtaining more of the ideals than woman. Thus, the dependency on most men that all females assumed, by virtue of their perceived moral physical and moral inferiority, directly dictated a "background" role in all matters of peacemaking and peacebuilding for females. Dependence on men, specifically a woman's father, brother(s), other paternal male kin, and husband could be lifelong. For example, a woman who married exogamously relied on her paternal male kin to protect her from her

husband and his kin mistreating her. Abu-Lughod relates that when a

camp treats poorly a woman who has married exogamously into it, it is a

challenge against her paternal kin; the paternal kin and the husband

must settle the dispute, not the wronged woman (1988, 54, 101). Women

were also restricted in their movements and interactions--in both sight

and speech--to places inside the camp. Outside the camp was outside the

sphere of close kin and in proximity of strangers who might, by some

act, jeopardize a woman's honor (Abu-Lughod 1988, 55, 57). Permission

was required to leave the camp and visit close kin and neighbors, and

visits to any public place, like a market, were not permitted (Abu-

Lughod 1988, 7).[9] All these restrictive requirements on women's ability

to act publicly stem from their need to invoke the modesty code, to do

otherwise would be dishonorable and shameful. In contrast, men could

come and go from the camp as needed due to their moral and physical

strength (Abu-Lughod 1988, 7). Males took positions as leaders in tents

and camps, and as sheikhs, consequently men were the third-party

interveners in disputes and the decision makers in all economic and

tribal matters (Abu-Lughod 1988, 30, 91; Kennett 1968, 36). Abu-Lughod

relays an event she witnessed in her fieldwork in which men were

negotiating a reconciliation between two factioned camps while the women

looked on:

> The atmosphere was tense. The women, sitting in a tent
> over looking the plain where several large white ceremonial
> tents had been pitched for the men, anxiously watched the
> men's comings and goings. . . . As the hours passed and it
> became clear that the meeting had gone smoothly, the women
> relaxed a bit (1988, 24-25).

Kennett (1968, 18-21) and Murray (1935, 52) also provide examples of

male heads intervening in disputes.

With the lack of any culturally imbued positions of prominence and

authority, it was impossible for women to play direct roles in the peacemaking or peacebuilding activities of the community and even of the tent. It was never their role to take part in or to initiate peacemaking activities such as an intervener or paying off crime debts. Neither were they ever involved with forming alliances, a clear peacebuilding event. Instead, as Abu-Lughod's (1988) example vividly illustrates, they were relegated, due to the modesty code, to watch from a distance. It was men who filled the peacemaking and peacebuilding roles.

ii) Law: Recourse and Court Process

The ideals held in the honor code were also upheld and expressed in the Customary law of the Awlad 'Ali. Ellwood, in his general discussion on the Islamic religion, makes the following comment concerning the connection of law and the Koran:

> From time to time [the Koran] gives instructions to the
> faithful upon which Muslim law is based. . . . The Holy
> Koran, they deeply believe, is the full and complete
> message of The Infinite Divine Mind to humanity. Thus, it
> is not only studied, but chanted, memorized, and recited
> ([1976] 1987, 218-219).

The fact that men were considered stronger than women in physical strength, morality, and all other respects, legislated a great deal of their law. Subsequently, if a man took advantage of a woman, using his superior strength,

> it is considered that the woman had no chance against the
> man, and that he was taking a mean advantage of his superior
> physical strength to overcome a weak defenseless creature.
> In such cases four times the usual bloodmoney [which would
> be exacted if murder took place between two males] would be
> insisted on, and the crime would be regarded as being very
> serious indeed (Kennett 1968, 133).

Kennett also remarks that "the value of a woman's life or the

compensation for a wound on a woman's body depend on whether she be killed, or whether the wound be inflicted, by a man or by a woman" (1968, 133). Under the law, wounds unjustly inflicted by a man on a woman were considered more serious than those inflicted by a woman on a man (Kennett 1968, 136-138). On the other hand, if the beating of a woman is justified, then the man has done nothing wrong. Kennett relates a case in point (1968, 135-138). In his example, both the man and woman had exceeded the bounds of propriety according to the sheikhs overseeing the case. The sheikhs pronounced their verdict, and "enunciated the principle that the man ought to have reported her behavior to her people, and then, in the presence of two or three of her family as witnesses, he would have been entitled to beat her", an option not available to the woman (Kennett 1968, 138). Abu-Lughod also makes the statement:

> Because men's positions in the hierarchy are validated by
> the voluntary deference shown them by their dependents,
> withdrawal of this respect challenges men's authority and
> undermines their position. . . . To reclaim it, he must
> reassert his moral superiority by declaring her actions
> immoral and must show his capacity to control her, best
> expressed in the ultimate form of violence (1988, 158).

Clearly, by law, males had the right to inflict violence on females, a right the women could not return, even when injustice was inflicted upon them by men. Verbal retaliation was acceptable to a point, according to Kennett's example, but for physical retaliation or any recompense, by court and most noncourt means, she must rely upon her paternal kin (1968, 136-138). In contrast males dealt directly with their own disputes. They had to show a strong front, one of strength and autonomy. Also resulting from male superiority, the law considered evidence provided by women to have low value. Evidence from a woman was

only acceptable if a case involved a woman or a case involved only women. Thus, the law also did not recognize nor provide women with any important roles in the process of peacemaking.

Placing the gender issue aside, I turn my attention to more general matters of law and procedure, key peacemaking strategies. Under the law, individual acts against another were not recognized; the assailant and his or her paternal kin and any other allied group were responsible for a crime and were responsible for retribution or restitution (Kennett 1968, 17-19, 30). The law was based on the axiom of an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth (Kennett 1968, 30; Khalof 1990, 29(3):227). In the past, individuals could take matters into their own hands if they felt wronged and felt a reprisal was in order (Kennett 1968, 38). However, more recently, such claims "must receive sanction of the tribe" and be claimed through the usual channels (Kennett 1968, 38). This type of reprisal is a "controlling" process resulting in a "domination" of one party over another, using Katz and Lawyer's (1993) terminology. In regards to peacemaking this idea of group responsibility is not necessarily advantageous to the quick termination of a dispute, as my application of Ross's (1993b) theories on the Awlad 'Ali will attest. On the other hand, the ability to quickly amass the funds from paternal kin and allies to pay compensation for a crime could quicken the conclusion of a dispute. Further, the change from personal choice to group determination of appropriate reprisals is an important mutation, one more advantageous towards peacemaking and peacebuilding. It makes peace because it is a community intervention which had potential to curb the number of disputes in the community by controlling possible "loose cannons" or "hot heads," people

who were quick to accuse and like to fight. It is a peacebuilding strategy because members were forced to control their initial reactions in disputes until the community ruled on the issue.

The convening of a court could be quite complex. The disputants never met face-to-face in disputes between families of the same tribe (Murray 1935, 227). Similarly, in disputes where retaliation might be severe--such as a murder--other people from other camps would represent the assailant and his/her kin (Murray 1935, 233). In some cases, representative sheikhs were chosen to start a third-party intervention process (Murray 1935, 233). Depending on the severity of the crime, one or more sheikh(s) might stand as judge-arbiter over the proceedings (Kennett 1968, 36). The intervening sheikh(s) would be approved by both disputing parties (Murray 1935, 227).

Once the parties agreed to conclude a dispute by court and a third-party was chosen, the court process began. The two disputing parties were each allowed, in turn, to state their cases. The intervener directed questions at each party as their story and evidence was presented:

> Hence in Bedouin Law any evidence at all, hearsay or otherwise, may be accepted at its own limited value, if it be considered that it will help to elucidate the facts . . . . If this hearsay evidence were ruled out as inadmissible in Bedouin Law, many cases would never be completed, nor settlements agreed to, with the result that feuds would remain (Kennett 1968, 47).

As a last resort, if there was no concrete or hearsay evidence, one party would take an oath. Depending on the severity of the crime in question, many other men, kin to the defendant or plaintiff, were called in to take an oath (Kennett 1968, 40).[10] An oath could affirm a person's guilt or innocence. The oath, was based on one's honor and

integrity as a moral person. If a chosen oathtaker refused to take oath, then the defendant was automatically guilty and judgment for the plaintiff was automatic (Kennett 1968, 42). The matter of oath taking in situations of incomplete evidence was an important peacemaking strategy in dispute proceeding, without it disputes would remain unsettled and long standing feuds, something already common among these people, would increase (Kennett 1968, 47).

Within procedural law there were "very definite rules and regulations governing their procedure" (Kennett 1968, 44). However, changes to procedure could arise if disputing parties agreed to the change and if the third-party endorsed the change. For example, "if rules of procedure dictated that defendant should swear backed by four others in a minor case, the oath of only two might be accepted if the plaintiff agreed" (Kennett 1968, 44). Interveners tried "each case on its own merits or demerits, than with rigid adherence to any specific formalance" (Kennett 1968, 44). The trick was to settle matters quickly or reprisals would occur (Kennett 1968, 47). Thus, acceptance of a change to the process would most likely further expedite a conclusion. The ability to alter procedural law is an important peacemaking strategy, with it the disputants have control over concluding their own dispute. Further, the need for the disputants to agree in order to change the process can build a positive atmosphere of cooperation; from one cooperative act could come many more.

In most case colonization by the British, which began around the early 1900s, was the cause of changes which occurred in Awlad 'Ali practices of law. Due to public outcry within Awlad 'Ali society, the eye-for-an-eye axiom was replaced with a response based on material

compensation (Kennett 1968, 49-59). For instance, blood money became accepted as compensation for a death instead of death for death. In addition, through the influence of British administration followed by Egyptian administration a more formal--permanent--court system was formed in each district, to be operated by several permanently assigned sheikhs (Kennett 1968, 36). Furthermore, Bedouin law and Egyptian law clashed at a fundamental level. Egyptian law applied to Bedouins, but Bedouins were only satisfied when Bedouin law had been exacted (Kennett 1968, 31). It did occur that a Bedouin received one punishment under Egyptian law and then another under Bedouin law (Kennett 1968, 31). It is interesting to note that, around 1925, when Kennett conducted his research, the Egyptian police and administrators used their own "discretion whether the official code shall be employed, or whether it shall be waived entirely in favor of the code understood and approved of both [Bedouin] parties" (1968, 31). Undoubtedly, further changes have occurred, as more Bedouin join government towns.

iii) Alliances and Reinforcing Ties

Before delving into a discussion of the various alliances, a brief discussion of Mauss's (1967) work on gift obligations is, again, in order. Mauss's work suggests that gift-giving is vital to the formation and maintenance of any relationship. Those objects which Mauss calls "gifts" are actually obligatory acts, expectations which secure a relationship and create an ongoing peacebuilding, positive, and cooperative interaction between parties. Gifts were obligatory in any alliance among the Awlad 'Ali; Abu-Lughod notes that "going and coming is accompanied by the exchange of gifts" (1988, 69). Gifts and counter-gifts were important to the relationship because they showed a continued

desire for the relationship (Abu-Lughod 1988, 69). In matters of dispute, alliances initially encouraged a cooperative spirit through the protocol of acceptable behaviors that the alliance demanded. However, continued neglect of obligatory actions could sever a tie--even a blood tie (Abu-Lughod 1988, 67).

In addition to the exchange of gifts, exchanges in the sharing of food, time, property, honor, residency, livelihood, important experiences, and more was vital. The more shared, the more sentiment; the more sentiment, the stronger the bond (Abu-Lughod 1988, 65). Abu-Lughod nicely summarizes the importance of reciprocal sharing:

> People often describe the existence of bonds between people, whether based on paternal or maternal kinship or just a common life, by using the phrase 'we go to them and they come to us'. This expression conveys nicely the way bonds between individuals are expressed and maintained. 'Coming and going' refers to reciprocity in both everyday visiting and ritualized visiting on particular occasions . . . . Failure to attend some [ritualized visits] is interpreted as a sign that the relationship has been terminated and the bond broken (1988, 66).

The fact that lineage is a base for allegiances towards one's tent and camp provides us with a glimpse of the most fundamental mechanism for forming alliances in the Awlad 'Ali society. Other mechanisms also forged alliances which helped maintain and build peaceful relationships between otherwise factioned camps and tents.

Marriage, for instance, could initiate a variety of alliances. Adults and children experienced two very different types of relationships within the exogamous marriage alliances. For the adults involved, the relationship was tenuous and easily broken (Abu-Lughod 1988, 53-54, 93-97). Upon marriage, the husband and his kin were obligated to care and protect the wife, or face retribution from her paternal kin: "When a woman leaves her kin's residential sphere at

marriage, their control over her must thenceforth be shared with her husband and his kin" (Abu-Lughod 1988, 147). But a woman marrying into another family was never fully accepted; instead, she was suspect and treated, to varying degrees, as an outsider: "Although a woman can never be incorporated into her husband's lineage, if she has adult sons she becomes secure and comfortable in her marital community" (Abu-Lughod 1988, 54). Evidently, the alliance was a tenuous one. Though a husband's paternal kin automatically supported the husband in matters surrounding his wife, the ties were predominantly between husband and in-laws: "Marriage gives a son affinal relations of his own" (Nimkoff 1965, 131).

Offspring of a marriage held a much more secure relationship with both paternal and maternal kin. A child's bond with maternal kin remained even in the event of divorce. In this society, the agnatic or paternal blood bond was the strongest, closest bond possible, with the maternal or affinal bond holding a lesser position (Abu-Lughod 1988, 50, 51); the weakness of a maternal bond lay in the fact that one could only go back a single generation when establishing a link, whereas, in establishing a paternal bond, one could go back five generations (Abu-Lughod 1988, 50). The affection between a mother's children and her paternal kin was based on the shared affection they both had for the same woman, mother or kinswoman respectively (Abu-Lughod 1988, 62). Thus, marriage alliances gave the children two different levels of security--the agnatic and affinal bonds--to be used and manipulated as adults. These alliances helped build peace, by creating a protocol of cooperation through the obligatory behavior they demanded.

In conjunction with these agnatic and affinal kinship ties, both

of which are based on lineage, came a tie which could be just as close, a tie based on action. The "action alliance" is another term for the formation of quasi-kin bonds (Abu-Lughod 1988, 63). In situations of consistent contact with, for example, close nonkin neighbors, the preference for kin was downplayed and a kin-like bond was created if both parties desired it (Abu-Lughod 1988, 63). The bond, in this case, was based on frequent contact between the two parties, contact which involved mutual sharing of food and experiences such as circumcisions, weddings, funerals, and births. These and other acts were crucial attributes of any alliance, again, because they built a strong sentiment (Abu-Lughod 1988, 63).

The importance of sharing food becomes particularly clear in the practice of the "food covenant". In this covenant, the alliance formed with a stranger visiting a tent was rather short-lived (Murray 1935, 37). It was assumed that the visitor would be under the protection of the host for three days, the amount of time the food was believed to be inside the visitor (Murray 1935, 37, 214). For example, a stranger was granted safe passage through the territory of a camp as a result of eating food belonging to one of its tents (Murray 1935, 37). In these cases a stranger meant another Bedouin. The food-covenant acted as a peacebuilding mechanism by changing a situation of suspicion and noncooperation into a situation of cooperative obligatory acts.

The Awlad 'Ali also had an "asylum mechanism", another form of alliance. If a perpetrator and, most likely, his or her immediate paternal kin going back five generations were being pursued by his or her victim, they could seek asylum in any tent. It was the honorable duty of the head of the tent and his camp kinsmen to protect the person

seeking asylum (Murray 1935, 212). The visitor might stay for many decades, until the matter was resolved. If the retaliating party were, at this point, to attack the protected guest, it would be considered an attack on the honor of the host, and the host would seek vengeance to restore his honor. In fact, a perpetrator could even seek asylum within the very tent of the people he or she victimized (Abou-Zeid 1966, 255). In this case, the host must still act as protector or lose his honor. At this point, the asylum mechanism curtailed the escalation of the dispute by minimizing the occurrence of further violence through reducing the chances of retribution by the victims. The "asylum alliance" also functioned as an initiator for reestablishing peace between two disputants. As protector, the host was obligated to begin an intervention process. Further, the asylum mechanism initiated the reestablishment of peace between two disputants. The protector was duty bound to seek out the possibility of concluding the dispute (Abou-Zeid 1966, 254-255). Again, given the low image Bedouin have for non-Bedouin it is unlikely that this asylum alliance was extended to non-Bedouin. However, this conclusion is inconclusive, because the data did not discuss the application of this alliance to non-Bedouin.

The dependence alliance, a more long-term, possibly cross-generational bond, could result from many circumstances. For example, it might transform out of an asylum alliance in which a dispute had continued for decades. It could also emerge from a person choosing to leave his former camp and to live near another tent on the land of another camp (Abou-Zeid 1966, 255; Murray 1935, 40). Dependents always remained dependents, though they did, in time, with the increase in sentiment, become part of the "tent's" family and the camp. Fictitious

kin ties and terms were eventually applied to dependents. The formation
of this alliance was identical to the formation of an "action alliance";
dependents were still obligated to do the bidding of the head, holding a
similar status position to that of young males. In return, they
received food, shelter, protection, honor, and much more (Abu-Lughod
1988, 83-84).

Despite these many ways one could form cooperative relationships,
the effects of the fundamental lineage alliance proved to be too
dominant. Lineage, as earlier mentioned, shaped relationships within
and outside the camp, shaped the placement of tents within a camp,
determined allegiances, shaped marriage patterns, shaped self-identity
and a person's social place in the community, and was the basis for the
formation of close-knit camps. Indeed, the act of tracking
relationships through lineage played a prominent role in creating a
reinforcing ties organizational framework (see Ross 1993b). The
presence of many self-reliant and politically independent camps, as well
as the fierce allegiances members carried for their camp are both key
features that identify the Awlad 'Ali as a reinforcing ties society.
Close lineage and a high degree of sentiment bound a camp together, but
shared interests in protecting and acting with honor provided a common
purpose and assisted in creating the fierce loyalties to a core group of
people. The myopic focus towards one's own camp is emphasized in the
preferred practice of endogamy, marrying within the camp. Endogamy
protects the interests of the camp by preventing the arrival of an
outsider whose absolute loyalty will be for her father's kin and camp in
all matters.

This reinforcing ties organization has certain predictable

implications for actions in disputes, as listed in Ross's (1993b) work
and revealed in the lives of the Awlad 'Ali. The importance of
sentiment in any relationship greatly affected the duration of disputes
and the possibility of a peaceful solution to disputes (Khalof 1990,
29(3):233). The closer the relationship, the more apt one was to accept
settlement (Khalof 1990, 29(3):233). This, coupled with the segregation
into camps along lineage lines, formed many groups with opposing
interests and sentiments. Ross (1993b) suggests (and the evidence
reveals) that this type of arrangement creates an atmosphere for greater
potential dispute than a society like the Azande, whose members share
more cross-cutting interests; because the Awlad 'Ali have a greater
number of people coming into contact who do not share similar interests.
Because of this higher chance of contacting Bedouin who are strangers--
having no sentiment--an atmosphere of suspicion and ambiguity of
intentions and action is quickly created (Ross 1993b, 39). Further,
this type of group solidarity creates an immediate support group when a
member disputes with a member of another camp (Ross 1993b, 39). With
the Awlad 'Ali, members rallied around their own because the honor of
every member in the camp was at stake with each dispute. Thus, even if
a member was murdered in a dispute, his or her camp members continued
the dispute until adequate justice was served, thereby saving the honor
of the camp. As a result of this collective action, Kennett noted that
disputes had the potential to escalate to more aggressive action, and to
last years before a conclusion was achieved (1968, 47). It is these
aspects of Awlad 'Ali culture that provide support for Ross's general
statement that, in the end, resolving a dispute is very difficult in
"reinforcing ties" cultures (1993b, 39).

iv)   Interaction with "Other"

        The importance of lineage and the honor code were also key in the

formation of one's sense of "self" and "other"--what is distinctive

between "us" and "them," making "us" a unique group. Ross discusses the

idea of "self" and "other" and shows how the formation of the

disposition of "self"--those who belong to a specific society--and

"other"--those who do not belong to that society--comes to be

internalized through socialization and institutions of the culture

(1993b, 51, 52, 57). He refers to this aspect of culture as

psychocultural, which is the shared dispositions a society has for

perceiving, dealing, and interacting with "self" and "other" (Ross

1993b, 52, 57). In this case, evaluating the various socialization and

institutional indicators put forward by Ross (1993b) lies beyond the

bounds of this thesis, however, other evidence aided in understanding

Awlad 'Ali's perceptions and behaviors in this area.

        For the Awlad 'Ali, lineage was a prominent social distinction.

At the macro level, all Bedouins were distinctive from all non-Bedouins

in their ability to prove an ancestral link to a true Arab paternal

ancestor. At the micro level, lineage provided each person with a

social place within a close knit group of kin called the camp. The

Bedouin had a proverb: "I and my brother against my cousin, and I and my

cousin stand together against the outside" (Khalof 1990, 29(3):231). In

this sense, "other" refers first to people outside one's tent, then

one's camp, then one's tribe, and finally, outside the Arab race. Abu-

Lughod provides a personal example of "otherness" within Bedouin

culture. In this situation, she and her "family" were joining a feast

in which other camps were involved. She writes that

> on entering the tent crowded with women, I knew exactly
> which cluster to join--the group of 'our' relatives. They
> welcomed me naturally and proceeded to gossip conspiratorially
> with me about the others present. This sense of 'us versus
> them', so central to their social interactions, had become
> central to me, too, and I felt pleased that I belonged to
> an 'us' (1988, 20).

Moving out from the camp, the level of sharing, which built sentiment, diminished. It is sentiment, discussed in detail earlier, which managed everyday relationships and behaviors, and made people more or less apt to act cooperatively in everyday life and in disputes (Abu-Lughod 1988, 32, 50; Khalof 1990, 29(3):233). The presence of a shared lineage was not strong or important enough within Awlad 'Ali society to ensure cooperative relationships across all Awlad 'Ali.

It was at the Arab versus non-Arab level where relationships had the greatest potential for conflict becoming dispute. Such was the case, because there were no sentiments or lineage shared upon which obligatory behaviors could be used to automatically transform a strained relationship--having no prescribed behavior--into an understood relationship--one with clearly defined behavior. Also, non-Arab status automatically placed a person in the lowest status of morality and honor; a non-Arab did not come from nobility, and had little moral status and worth (Abu-Lughod 1988, 45-49). This belief was the impetuous for much of the hostility Awlad 'Ali had towards outsiders (Abu-Lughod 1988, 13). Further, the fact that alliances, used within society to build and make peace, do not appear to be available in contacts with Bedouin and non-Bedouin, also suggests that attaining and sustaining cooperation with non-Bedouin was very difficult. The Awlad 'Ali ethnographies provided no examples of the Awlad 'Ali applying their alliances in Bedouin versus non-Bedouin interactions. Thus, cooperation

was the least likely between Arabs and non-Arabs.

C. FACEWORK

Clearly, the codes of honor and modesty are important components if understanding of the Awlad 'Ali peacemaking and peacebuilding strategies is to be achieved.

The concepts and expectations of the honor code were closely intertwined with the "facework" practices of these people. Indeed, the loss of honor could be interpreted as a loss of face. The preservation, maintenance, and building of personal face was not built and maintained by the individual, a practice common to "modern" cultures, according to Augsburger (1992). Instead, establishing face was a negotiated event, requiring each person in the community to recognize and to verify the social status and honor level of each member with each interaction that occurred.

In this context, each party in an interaction was obligated by the codes to implement certain behavioral patterns or values based on the social status of the other party and their own social status, behaviors which verified the position of each. By showing concern for and securing the face of the other, the initiator secured his or her own face as well through the community's approval of his or her proper etiquette: "Individuals must earn the respect on which their positions rest, through the embodiment of their society's moral ideals" (Abu-Lughod 1988, 86). These and other actions suggest both "other-positive" and "other-negative" facework strategies, as Augsburger's (1992) review states. An "other-positive" strategy, once again, "uses certain communication strategies to defend and support the other person's need for inclusion and association" while an "other-negative" strategy is one

that shows respect for the other person's need for autonomy, dissociation, and space (Ting-Toomey cited in Augsburger 1992, 89).

All Awlad 'Ali were concerned with the face of other Awlad 'Ali, regardless of the social status. A Bedouin of superior social status associating with a Bedouin of inferior social status was keenly aware of maintaining the honor of the inferior, even while "lording it over" the inferior. Honor required the superior to go to great lengths to treat inferiors with the same respect by drawing

> as little attention as possible to the inequality of their relationship. . . . Those in authority are also expected to respect their dependents' [, which included nondependant inferiors,] dignity by minimizing open assertion of their power over them. Because the provider's position requires dependents, he risks losing his power base if he alienates them

by neglecting their face needs (Abu-Lughod 1988, 99). This action on the part of the superior validated the importance of the inferior in the interaction and the community activities. Both shared a "high regard for autonomy and equality, the values of honor" (Abu-Lughod 1988, 103). This action by superiors brought community approval because it was the superior's duty not to take advantage of the weak. Failure brought disapproval by community and a withdrawal of validating actions by the inferior: "Bedouins act as though authority must be earned. Because authority is achieved, it can also be lost" (Abu-Lughod 1988, 85).

Awlad 'Ali of inferior social status simultaneously showed concern for the face of Awlad 'Ali of superior social status by attending to the modesty code. Such action validated the superior's position in society and signaled respect for the superior's space and autonomy (Abu-Lughod 1988, 158). Thus, the modesty code invoked both "other-positive" and "other-negative" facework behaviors among inferiors.

Superior social status, however, did not deny the lower person in

social status recourse in disputes. On the contrary, if a wife was

treated poorly she could complain to her father or raise the issue in

her camp in terms of a breach in honor. Also, there were

> sanctions that check the power of their providers. Anyone
> can appeal to a mediator to intervene on his or her behalf,
> and more radical solutions are open to all but young
> children. Clients can simply leave an unreasonable patron
> and attach themselves to a new one (Abu-Lughod 1988, 100).

It appeared that the issue could be raised by an appropriate advocate of

equal status, a personal appeal could be made to the camp, the person

could leave, and much more, depending upon the issue. In disputes

involving low- and high-status people, in which the former had been

wronged, the injured party seemed to invoke an indirect approach, an

other-negative facework, in an effort to act modestly towards and

respect the superior, but also to directly address the challenge against

his or her own face or honor. Contrarily, a superior being challenged

by a lower-status person invoked a "self-negative facework". Self-

negative facework refers to interactive strategies in which the

individual is responsible for maintaining personal "freedom and space,

to protect self from the other's infringement on one's autonomy" (Ting-

Toomey cited in Augsburger 1992, 89). The superior, in response,

invoked drastic direct measures, even physical violence against the

inferior, to reassert and protect his challenged status; "In the eyes of

others, a dependent's rebellion dishonors the superior by throwing into

question his moral worth, the very basis of his authority" (Abu-Lughod

1988, 158). This direct action showed concern only for protecting

personal face, and disregarded the face of the inferior. Visible

violent action of this sort publicly emphasized the inferior's lack of

autonomy, because the inferior had to accept the punishment without

retaliation (or face further violence). Such violence on the part of superiors was sanctioned by law. Thus, in this case, the actions of the superior is in keeping with self-negative facework strategies. However, in this case, the preservation of face (honor) in the community was still based on the communities judgment of the superior's and inferior's actions.

Among those who were equal in social status, there was also a negotiation of face, but it was accompanied by a struggle to increase personal status which inevitably meant diminishing the other's status;

> Gadr[the characteristic of power related to males] is
> the particular ability to resist others through equal or
> greater strength; it depends both on personal courage and
> assertiveness and on wealth, since generosity and hospit-
> ality are means of making others dependent (Abu-Lughod 1988, 88).

This struggle to raise personal face by potentially lowering another's face gives an appearance of a self-positive facework strategy, because equals seem to be personally in charge of protecting and advancing personal face needs of honor with an apparent disregard for the face or honor of the other equal. And in some respects, this is the case. Individuals were in charge of protecting their own honor, and, thus, their own face. However, even in interactions among equals, face was not determined by the person, but by the reaction of the other equal to the challenge and by the community's judgment of the interaction. According to Abu-Lughod, a challenge "validates an individual's honor by recognizing him as worth challenging" (1988, 89-90). The manner in which the challenged responds to the challenger also validates the challenger's status:

> An alternate strategy for asserting honor is defensive
> denial of concern, hence of the very existence of an attack.
> As Bourdieu (1979, 108) notes, 'non-response can also express
> the refusal to riposte; the recipient of the offence refuses

>to see it as an offence and by his disdain . . . he causes it
>to rebound on its author, who is thereby dishonoured'
>(Abu-Lughod 1988, 205).

Thus, though personal face increased with a successful challenge initiated by an individual, face increase still depended on the community's and the challenged's endorsement or dismissal of the act. In addition, such a challenge was reinterpreted in a way that portrayed a person showing respect for the challenged person's face.

Face strategies, then, are crucial behaviors in the Awlad 'Ali peacebuilding process. Among the Awlad 'Ali, the mostly other-oriented face strategies (or behavior strategies) maintain amicable relationships by showing respect for each other's social status. This ultimately creates and maintains a cooperative atmosphere between parties.

As a corollary to facework is the use of direct and indirect speech and action. According to Augsburger, direct behavior is more associated with self-negative face, while indirect behavior is connected with other-negative face. Augsburger (1992) suggests that all "traditional" cultures are other oriented, while all modern cultures are self oriented in their facework. The Awlad 'Ali, however, show hints of both in their repertoire of face-negotiated strategies, with "other" being the more prominent. And the evidence suggests that both direct and indirect action were used.

In summary, the information on Awlad 'Ali facework suggests the use of direct or indirect speech and action depended on place and social status. Directness involved speaking one's mind and acting immediately when challenged by another person. Indirectness meant that one hedged his or her words, not speaking one's mind. It also entailed dealing with a challenge through indirect means, such as leaving without

confronting. Direct discourse was part of the honor code, and, thus, part of life. Superiors were expected to be direct with everyone in public, and inferiors had to be as direct as the modesty code would allow. Inferiors, however, must be indirect in dispute situations with socially superior people.

In disputes, indirectness, in any form of speech, was considered dishonorable because it violated the honor code. Indirect speech was vague and nonassertive, showing signs of cowardice and fear at speaking the truth and at the challenge. In the same way, the honor code obliged the challenged person to act immediately, decisively, and directly. To act indirectly at the beginning of a dispute showed vulnerability and weakness. However, the use of a third-party as an intervener or as a representative was not considered to be indirect and, thus, dishonorable. I came across numerous cases in which both disputants and their camp members agreed to third-party intervention. With the passage of time, intervention by a third-party became an option; this did not mean that the disputants lost their indignation and willingness to deal with the matter directly. In intervention circumstances, the assailant might send in his kin to represent him because his victim and/or the victim's kin might, during the proceedings, turn on him. And in some cases, the assailant and his or her kin might choose a representative because of the volatility of the situation.

Notes

1   Though I write of things in the past, it does not mean that the Awlad 'Ali do not still practice these things today.

2   Turner (1969) states that there are usually three phases to all ritual processes, starting with separation to liminal and ending with reaggregation. For Turner's discussion of rituals see Turner (1969).

3   Given the rest of their cultural practices, I believe that, before this change, an illegitimate reprisal would meet with public scrutiny and disapproval. Thus, in this case, the Awlad 'Ali have not moved into a collective method of determining appropriate reprisals.

4   Tribes, according to Kennett, could constitute twenty to twenty-thousand men (1968, 13). A clan was formed when a lineage line became large enough to form its own clan or lineage (Murray 1935, 36). Murray refers to clans as an association of families, so it is possible that he is referring to a camp (1935, 36). Tribes did not consist of permanent clans, because tribes were only names in which clans moved around occasionally (Murray 1935, 40). However, according to Kennett, the creation of new tribes seemed to occur when clan groups become too large and it was more "convenient" to divide (1968, 14). Thus, clans could divide and form new lineages and still remain under the same tribe name, or, alternately, clans could divide and form a new tribal name.

5   In the past the Awlad 'Ali were all nomadic, but most have taken to living in brick buildings, a change which makes nomadism impossible. Many also lived in towns, but not all, as Abu-Lughod's (1988) work attests.

6   With the advent of permanent settlements, the use of permanent brick structures, this practice was only loosely practiced by bedouins living in such dwellings (Abu-Lughod 1988, 6).

7   For more on these courts, see Kennett's (1968) book Bedouin Justice.

8   For a further description of Augsburger's (1992) "traditional" and "modern" classifications as well as a deeper discussion on his review of gender in law, see Chapter Two of this thesis.

9   Unmarried women appear to be even more restricted than young married women. As Abu-Lughod discovered in her own situation, "a young, unmarried woman traveling alone on uncertain business was an anomaly. She would be suspect and would have a hard time persuading people of her respectability . . . . Any girl valued by her family, especially an unmarried girl whose virginity and reputation were critical to a good match, would not be left unprotected to travel alone at the mercy of anyone who wished to take advantage of her" (Abu-Lughod 1988, 11-12). In turn, older women had less restrictions than young married women; they could attend public events such as the market (Abu-lughod 1988, 7).

10   In a crime of twenty pounds or less, the disputants would take an oath, but in crimes above twenty pounds, four other men were required to take an oath (Kennett 1968, 40-41). In murder cases, the number of men taking oaths could climb to fifty (Kennett 40-41). Kennett (1968) provides details for the choosing of these extra men to take oaths.

Some Conclusions

Given the importance of culture in the lives of individuals and groups, in preserving the lives of its designers through its adaptive knowledge of survival and its prominent position in instructing the behaviors of its designers in purposeful interaction, the centrality of culture in cross-cultural disputes is obvious. A person's culture is a filter through which she or he understands, perceives, manipulates, and responds to the world. This being the case, a third-party intervener must necessarily gain an emic understanding of each disputant's knowledge and perception towards peacemaking and peacebuilding in a cross-cultural dispute.

Research shows that each cultural group differs in perception, understanding, and response to peace, conflict, and disputes. The cross-cultural research of Ross (1993b) shows how the different organizational strategies and socialization practices of a people subsequently produce different levels and directions of peace and dispute behavior. Augsburger (1992) clearly notes the broad differences that can be drawn between two general types of cultures, modern and traditional. And the cross-cultural research presented in this thesis supports the basic premise that significant differences exist between cultures. However, more importantly, my research demonstrates that differences in perceptions, understanding, and responses to peace, conflict, and disputes even exist between what Augsburger (1992) would classify as two traditional cultures.

Though the Azande and the Awlad 'Ali hold general cultural similarities in orientation (for example, both are collective and

context based; both desire informal mediation before more formal third-party intervention; and, in both cultures, men represent women in disputes, and only men preside over disputes), they differ in many other key areas, differences which, in turn, create different perceptions, understandings, and responses to peace, conflict, and disputes. For instance, in determining the truth about a dispute (that is, what happened, who is the offender, and did he or she actually commit the offence), different peacemaking mechanisms are used in the two cultures. The Azande rely on magic, such as that of the benge, to reveal truth and substantiate claims, whereas the Awlad 'Ali rely on the honor of the individual to tell the truth and support a person's claims. Thus, the Azande use external methods and the Awlad 'Ali use internal methods. The reason for this difference lies in the fact that the Azande perceive themselves as a deceitful people and the Awlad 'Ali focus on honor, and, subsequently, honesty as key characteristics in their people. The former breeds mistrust between community members (even, to a lesser extent, within alliance relationships) requiring an external mechanism in times of dispute to present the truth. The latter fosters trust between members because of the severe consequences to one's character if untruths are spoken, making an internal mechanism adequate for presenting truth in disputes.

Further, the structure of the societies themselves reveal significantly different attitudes towards peace, conflict, and dispute. The Awlad 'Ali have built many small pockets of peaceful sentiment-based relationships within the many camps, relationships which have formed through the alliance mechanisms of lineage and dependence. Within the camp, high levels of cooperation and solidarity are maintained in both

peace and dispute situations. Between the groups, however, peaceful relationships are not nurtured, with the possible exception of short-term "food covenant" alliances. Because of this weak emphasis on peacebuilding mechanisms across a broader community base, and because of the propensity of camp members to back their fellow camp members in disputes (due to the need to save personal honor and that of the group), peacemaking is usually a long, drawn out matter involving many people. The Azande, on the other hand, have built and encouraged, at the local community, and larger provincial and kingdom levels, alliances with a vast number of people, avoiding the formation of multiple small interest groups. As in the Awlad 'Ali and other cultures, familiarity in the Azande breeds cooperation in peaceful and divisive situations. As a result of the multiple cross-cutting ties, mostly within kingdoms, which bind a diverse people together, peace is usually reached quickly and feuding is discouraged.

Even the speech mechanisms expected of members in public, specifically in public disputes, bears witness to the different perception of the two cultures to peace, conflict, and dispute. The Azande use indirect speech, speaking in metaphors and other circumlocutors that mask the actual message they want to convey. The Awlad 'Ali, conversely, speak directly in public disputes, being perfectly willing (unafraid) to counter-attack verbally and physically and display their outrage towards each other.

Assuming, then, that culture is a key component in cross-cultural dispute intervention, the strategy of third-party cross-cultural intervention must necessarily include some analysis of that culture. The method I put forth in this thesis provides the tools with which to

glean pertinent information about a cultural group's peacebuilding and peacekeeping mechanisms, and its perceptions towards peace, conflict, and disputes. From this collected information, peace methodological constructs can be formed, methods of intervention to bring about a positive, lasting conclusion to a cross-cultural dispute.

From the Azande literature, for instance, one can formulate the following peace methodological construct. The intervener benefits from the fact that third-party intervention (in which a third person oversees the disputants' attempts to resolve their dispute) is an acceptable way to deal with disputes; this acceptability places the intervener in a good position to bring a conclusion to the situation. Because there are three levels of this type of intervention in Azande culture (homestead, provincial, and king courts), the lasting quality of a third-party intervention might be questioned. The level disputants assign to the intervention taking place could determine if a disputant takes his case to another intervener. For example, at the family court, a disputant, by right, could take the dispute to the chief's court if the disputant felt the verdict did not fit the evidence. Thus, prior to commencing the intervention, the third-party should make the intervention as binding as possible within the established system of law in which intervention is occurring.

Since third-party intervention (of the type described above) is not usually the first choice for resolving disputes, one should assume that other more informal means have been exhausted. Thus, the intervener is, again, in a good position for bringing a lasting conclusion to a dispute; it is the Azande's last mechanism for ending disputes. Of course, the motivation to conclude a dispute is based on

the importance of the relationship between the disputants and the importance of community harmony. If, for instance, the dispute takes place in a North American urban neighborhood in which the Zande disputant has little commitment towards or friendships with his neighbors, then maintaining community harmony may not be a real motivation as it would . Further, the Azande may chose intervention because he thinks his case has merit enough to win and to receive material compensation. Thus, investigating motivation determines the possible binding power of the conclusion, and understanding the expectation of compensation informs the third-party of the possible reason for the Azande disputant entering the intervention process.

The analysis provided in Chapter Two also provides information on who can act as a third-party and who will be present during intervention; this involves issues of gender and social status. Given the low status of women in this culture and the low opinion males have towards women, it is not surprising that women do not represent others or themselves in interventions considered to be part of the public domain, the domain of males. The same holds true for young unmarried males. Thus, male kin represent females in intervention, and the third-party should expect only male representatives to participate in the dispute. Further, since women never act as a third-party, a female intervener will cause problems. Even for a male intervener, social status can be cause for concern. If the social status of the third-party is lower than that of the Zande disputant(s), then the intervener is perceived to have little authority in concluding the matter.

The process of third-party intervention should also be considered. For example, Azande accept circumstantial evidence and evidence acquired

through magical means. We also know that context plays a part in the evidence presented. If such evidence is inadmissible in the legal system in which the intervention is taking place, the third-party must determine how to solve this clash of legal systems without derailing the process.

Another part of the Azande intervention process includes allies who join as representatives, witnesses, and/or assist in paying the fines. (Allies of a dead victim, for example, will take the expected perpetrator to court.) One must also consider the expected behavior of the disputant(s). A Zande disputant subjugates to the third-party, shows other-negative facework, and speaks in (indirect) circumlocution speech. Subjugation depends on social status issues between the third-party and disputant. If the third-party is of higher status, subjugation can pose a problem if mediation is the desired process. Thus, the type of intervention must be determined prior to commencing the process. The practice of other-negative facework ensures a certain level of civility between the disputants during the intervention process; however, the use of circumlocutors and the subsequent veiled meanings will make communication difficult.

Finally, one must consider expected outcome. Those who initiate the intervention usually do so because they expect the verdict to be in their favor and to provide them with material compensation. This, again, raises the issue of which intervention process to use, because mediation seeks a win/win situation, but processes that conclude compensation are usually win/lose in nature. Indeed, this is in keeping with adjudication interventions, the process with which they are familiar and expect in third-party intervention.

The analysis of Zande culture also raises some important issues concerning the Zande perception and treatment of "other". When a Zande man interacts with a stranger, because the motivation, intent, and behavior of the stranger is unknown, the situation is inevitably tense. However, familiarity and alliances reduce these tensions, paving the way for a more cooperative relationship. The evidence supports the possibility of using their alliance mechanisms to create more cooperative relationships between Zande and nonZande disputants. Making these the preliminary goals of the intervention process would assist in concluding the dispute more expediently.

The last peace methodological conclusion to be drawn is that the Azande accept conflict and dispute as natural occurrences; thus, the mere presence of a dispute is familiar and expected, and will not heighten emotion. In such cases, the third-party need not be concerned with emotional issues related to being in a dispute situation. However, given their cross-cutting ties organization--a point which suggests a society of low internal dispute, according to Ross's (1993) research-- and apparent dislike for community disruption--evident in their quick action to resolve disputes--tolerance for being in a dispute may be low. This suggests that though the Zande disputant accepts disputes as part of life he may still be highly motivated to resolve the dispute and conclude the disruption to his daily living.

The Awlad 'Ali, in turn, have their own peace methodological construct. Central to the issue of third-party intervention (in which a third person oversees the process concluding a dispute) is the issue of when an intervener is used. Again, it is advantageous that third-party intervention is an accepted practice; the formality of the process will

promote its success. However, problems arise if the intervener is chosen by someone other than the disputants, since the Awlad 'Ali usually allow the disputants and/or kin to choose a third-party. (For the Awlad 'Ali, unlike the Azande, the disputants or their representatives mutually consent to a third-party.) If the third-party, in an Awlad 'Ali dispute, is assigned by outsiders, resistance to the process and adherence to the outcome may be forthcoming. The mutual agreement in itself starts an intervention process on a positive course; the collaboration between the disputants shows similarities in preferences and shows that agreement between them is possible. This is something of which the chosen intervener should take advantage.

The choice of who can be the third-party is also important. If the intervener is nonBedouin, the validity of the outcome is questioned, because the outcome of a dispute is accepted only if the verdict comes from a Bedouin, using Bedouin customary law. This acceptance of only Bedouin Law creates its own complications, because the Awlad 'Ali disputant may not accept the conclusion of an intervention process which uses another law. Further, to the issue of choosing an intervener, there is the issue of social status. Among the Awlad 'Ali, third-parties possess the highest status in the community--determined by wealth and honor--and proven ability to reason. NonArabic persons are frowned upon for their lack of honor and for their poor genealogy, an attitude that could undermine any progress on the part of a nonBedouin intervener. As with the Azande, gender must also be considered when determining the eligibility of a third-party. For the Awlad 'Ali, males lead and intervene in public disputes; the presence of women outside the camp is shameful and would thus have no place in a dispute that takes

place outside of camp.

The negative perceptions Awlad 'Ali have towards nonBedouin is another important issue an intervener must overcome. The Awlad 'Ali rely heavily on the honor of the disputants to present the truth in their intervention processes, a mechanism not applicable with nonBedouin who are perceived to have no honor. Thus, they do not appear to have a mechanism for concluding disputes amicably, without violent personal reprisal. Also, the apparent inability to successfully use any of their alliance mechanisms makes creating an atmosphere of trust difficult in cross-cultural intervention involving an Awlad 'Ali disputant.

Like the Azande, the Awlad 'Ali have an established process for intervention. They rely on adjudication, with a level of arbitration included, achieving mostly win/lose conclusions requiring compensation. This format could be a point of contention if the third-party has chosen mediation which aims for a win/win outcome. Thus, choice of process is central to intervention with an Awlad 'Ali disputant.

The behavior and speech of the Awlad 'Ali disputant(s) within the process is based on the honor code. When attacked and attacking, honor is at stake; thus, the honor code dictates that, in public, a person must act assertively and aggressively, with anger, blame, and indifference. Consequently, self-negative facework should be expected. The preservation or restoration of honor, dependent on the social status dynamics between the disputants, is important in making the conclusion acceptable and in preventing the dispute from continuing. The Awlad 'Ali sheikhs practiced arbitration in order to preserve the honor of both sides. Though their law gives clear losers and winners, they often aim to find fault on both sides making both sides compensate each other,

though it may not be an equal compensation.

The presentation of evidence could become an issue within an intervention process if the legal system in which the third-party functions only accepts concrete evidence. Awlad 'Ali prefer concrete evidence as well, but they also allow circumstantial evidence and the oath of a disputant if concrete evidence is unavailable. Given these perceptions, the definition of acceptable evidence must be determined prior to commencing the process.

Further to the issue of process is that of representation. If violent retaliation is a strong possibility, the offender and his kin will refuse to appear with the victim and/or his or her kin. Thus, there is a good chance that all interaction will be with representatives throughout the whole process, or the third-party may first direct attention to establishing assurances of civility from the offended party. Alternatively, since a dispute automatically involves a person's kin, the intervener may find him- or herself dealing with many male representatives. Thus, the third-party must remember that the outcome not only affects the honor of the actual disputant but also that of the disputants's kin.

In conclusion, the issue of motivation to conclude the dispute should also be addressed. Given their apparent reinforcing ties organization--a point which suggests a society of high internal dispute, according to Ross's (1993) research--and greater interest in preserving honor than avoiding community disruption--evident in the prevalence of their long lasting feuds--tolerance for being in a dispute may be high. Thus, motivation to conclude the dispute quickly may be absent. Instead, motivation is directed towards preserving honor no matter what

the cost.

Because these peace methodological constructs are predominantly based on traditional beliefs and practices, their application is strongest or weakest depending on the disputants's level of adherence to his or her traditional ways. The third-party must, therefore, consider acculturation, assimilation, and personal differences in the disputants perception of his or her culture.

Acculturation is a key issue in the application of the peace methodological constructs to a peacemaking process. Major changes, such as those in gender status and community roles, have already occurred with the Azande, and changes such as the formalization of a more permanent court system has also occurred with the Awlad 'Ali. Acculturation is "continuous and intense contact between two previously autonomous cultural traditions, usually leading to extensive changes in one or both systems" (McElroy and Townsend [1985] 1989, 297). The difficulty acculturation presents to the application of the peace method constructs lies in the fact that acculturation occurs at different rates across members of a society (McElroy and Townsend [1985] 1989, 297). The research of McElroy and Townsend ([1985] 1989) also suggests that observable external changes, such as clothing, do not necessarily indicate significant change in the internal beliefs and adherence to traditional ways. A continuum of adherence levels exist which, on one end, shows those who vehemently hold onto their traditional ways despite the encroachment of another society's culture, and, on the other end, shows those who have assimilated into the other society. Assimilation, according to McElroy and Townsend, "occurs when one group changes so completely that it becomes fully integrated into the dominant society"

([1985] 1989, 298).

In light of these very real possibilities of acculturation and assimilation, the third-party can do several things. In order to grasp the level of acculturation with a disputant I suggest several visits to the disputant's home. This allows the third-party to observe family dynamics and the disputant's living habits to see how closely they reflect traditional life. Also, it is beneficial to construct a peace method for the other culture with which the disputant is in contact, since the culture might come into play in the dynamics of the peacemaking process. By familiarizing him- or herself to both possible strategies, the intervener will be prepared for changes in method that may occur.

As already discussed in the Introduction, each member of a society experiences, responds to, and perceives his or her culture differently, with each member bringing unique ideas, behaviors, and expectations to the continual process of shaping culture. This difference is caused by personality, which is shaped by biology, experiences in life, socialization, and environmental conditions. Thus, the peace methodological constructs are average patterns of behavior, beliefs, and perceptions found to be true in most members of the society to which the construct applies. As with acculturation, this uniqueness does not negate the relevancy of building such constructs; however, it means that the third-party must be aware of possible variations in the construct's application to a particular disputant.

With the ever-increasing interaction of different societies and nations, due to the increase in aviation and communication technologies, the idea of one global community is becoming a reality; more cultures

are becoming a part of this global community, and, consequently, the number of cultural beliefs and practices at play within local communities increases daily. It is paramount that third-party intervention practices acknowledge and respond to this reality in their theoretical and methodological frameworks of intervention. Each society does indeed perceive and respond to peace, conflict, and dispute situations differently, creating its own unique peacemaking and peacebuilding strategies. The third-party must gain an emic perspective if intervention is to be a viable option for concluding cross-cultural disputes.

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